那个五项方案是在以色列的七项方案基础上提出来的。中国最初对以色列的七项方案感兴趣。南韩驻以色列大使Young Sam Ma 在 Isreael's Role in the UN during the Korean War 中写道：

An opportunity for the Israeli delegation to play a greater role in the discussions
on the Korean War came unexpectedly. In December 1950, Sharett was visiting
UN headquarters. He was invited to a dinner hosted by Lie in honor of the
Chinese (PRC) delegation. It should be noted that Israel was among the first
non-Communist nations that recognized the People’s Republic of China (as early
as January 1950), and talks were underway in Moscow to explore possibilities of
diplomatic relations between Israel and China.

Over dinner, Sharett spoke with a Chinese delegate and outlined a seven-point
plan on how to end the Korean War:

• an immediate ceasefire;
• withdrawal of foreign troops;
• elections under the UN’s supervision;
• China’s participation in UN activities;
• rehabilitation programs;
• independence of Korea guaranteed by the UN and China; and
• UN–China discussions on outstanding issues.

These ideas were met with interest by the Chinese delegation. The secretary general
was excited by the Chinese response. He asked the Israeli delegation to
“discuss it with… like-minded delegates and then circulate it in the form of a draft
resolution.” With his encouragement, the Israeli delegation assisted the Ceasefire
Committee in drafting a Statement of Principles based on Israel’s original seven point
plan. With a draft resolution of his own,  Ambassador Eban proposed these
ideas to the First Committee, which initially received positive reactions from many
other delegations.  However, according to witnesses, some delegations, which
were at odds with Israel, challenged Israel’s authorship of the resolution. The diary
of then-Canadian Foreign Minister Lester B. Pearson contained the following
observation: “The difficulty arose over the fact that the resolution sponsoring the
statement and referring it to Peking ‘for their observations’ has been sponsored by
Israel. This was enough to arouse the ire and opposition….” 

In the face of such hurdles, some core members of the resolution sought a creative
way out.  They finally agreed that the Statement of Principles  would be initially
put to a vote at the First Committee. Then the Norwegian delegation would
present a resolution  calling on the UN secretary-general to convey the Statement
of Principles to the Chinese government. As agreed, these procedures were
carried out,  and the Israeli delegation gave up its authorship of the resolution.
Nonetheless, its substance remained intact. The original version of the Israeli
resolution was composed of two parts. The first was designed to “approve” the
Statement of Principles (UN Document A/C.1/645). The other part was a call
to “transmit these principles to the Central People’s Government of the People’s
Republic of China and invite it to send its observations….”
“No change in substance,” encouraged Abba Eban to show his flexibility. At
the session in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on January 13,
1951, at which this issue was hotly debated, Eban said: “The first part of the Israeli
draft resolution (A/C.1/647) did not have to be voted upon because its purpose
had been fulfilled.”  After the Norwegian delegation made a counter-proposal to
replace the Israeli resolution, Eban “supported the Norwegian proposal, which
he thought did not differ substantially from his own.”  Although Israel’s name
did not appear in the final resolution, the whole process, as mentioned above, was
initiated and orchestrated by the Israeli delegation. The Israeli initiative became
the basis for the ensuing negotiation for an Armistice Agreement of the Korean
War.

美国不喜欢五项方案的最后一项，但还是投了同意。美国国务卿这样解释：

（见 Guide to the U.N. in Korea; a year of collective action，DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 4299， FAR EASTERN SERIES 47， RELEASED AUGUST 1951，DIVISION OF PUBLICATIONS . OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS ）

"It [the cease-fire proposal] had the support of the overwhelming
majority of the U.N. members. This support was founded on two
principal attitudes. One was the belief of many members that the
Chinese Communists might still be prevailed upon to cease their
defiance of the United Nations. While we did not share this belief,
we recognized that it was sincerely held by many members.

"The second attitude was that, even though there might be little
prospect of success in the approach to Peiping, the United Nations
should leave no stone unturned in its efforts to find a peaceful solu-
tion. Holders of each view believed and stated to us that opposition
or abstention by the United States would destroy any possibility of
success which the proposal might have.

"Peaceful settlement is one of the cardinal purposes of the United
Nations. The resort to force in Korea came from the North Koreans
first and the Chinese Communists second. The United Nations has
constantly demanded that this should end and that the United Nations
objectives should be attained by peaceful means — we have stood
and still stand for this position. Also it has been our goal to so
act as to maintain the unity of the free nations against aggression
which has marked the United Nations actions in Korea. Accord-
ingly, we voted for the resolution to demonstrate our adherence to
these basic principles even though we did not share the beliefs of
other members . . . that it would achieve its purposes."

与中国主要的分歧是要立即停火，还是先谈再停火，还有美国从台湾撤军以及恢复联合国席位等问题。联合国文件里这样写：（见 International Organization, Vol. 5, No. 2 (May, 1951), pp. 315）

The Political and Security Committee met again on January 18 to consider the reply of the Peking government to the five principles which had been trans- mitted to it. The earlier statement of the Central People's Government was repeated in the cable: that a rapid end to hostilities in Korea should be sought by negotiations among the various countries concerned based on the withdrawal of all non-Korean troops from Korea and the settlement of Korean affairs by the Koreans themselves, that United States forces should be withdrawn from Fornosa and that the representatives of the People's Republic of China should assume their rightful place in the United Nations. The Central People's govern- ment could not accept the principle of the arrangement of a cease-fire in Korea first and negotiations among the various countries afterwards as that would merely give the United States a breathing space. Regardless of the subject matter of the negotiations they might entail endless negotiations without solving any problems if the cease-fire came into effect without prior negotiations to fix its conditions. Four more principles were submitted in the cable: 1) nego- tiations should be held among the countries concerned on the basis of agree- ment to the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and the settlement of Korean domestic affairs by the Korean people themselves; 2) the subject matter of the negotiations should include the withdrawal of the United States armed forces from Formosa and the Formosan straits as well as other far eastern prob- lems; 3) the countries to participate in the negotiations should be the following: the People's Republic of China, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States, France, India and Egypt; and 4) the rightful place of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations should be established as from the beginning of the seven-nation conference; 5) the seven-nation conference should be held in China at a place to be selected. If these proposals were agreed to by the countries concerned and by the United Nations, the People's Republic believed that to hold negotiations as soon as possible would help to terminate the hostilities in Korea promptly and to settle the Asian problems peacefully.

中国的回答引起了不同的反应，美国认为中国是要挟，澳大利亚，法国，印度尼西亚，伊拉克，印度则认为这个回答给了谈判一线希望，认为无论如何联合国should go slowly。

一月22日，印度代表转交了中国外交部的答复:（见 International Organization, Vol. 5, No. 2 (May, 1951), pp. 316）

The foreign office had replied that 1) if the principle that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from Korea had been accepted and was being put into practice, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China would assume the responsibility of advising the Chinese volunteers to return to China; 2) the conclusion of the war in Korea and the peaceful settlement of the Korean prob- lem, could be proceeded upon in two steps: a cease-fire for a limited time period agreed upon at the first meeting of the seven-nation conference; and all the conditions for the conclusion of the war discussed in connection witlh the politi- cal problems in order to reach agreement on the steps for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, i.e. steps for the settlement of Korea affairs by the Korean people, the withdrawal of United States forces from Formosa and otlher problems concerning the far east; 3) tlhe definite affirmation of the legiti- mate status of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations should be assured.

尽管美国等国认为这个答复没有什么新东西，英国等国认为：the new message was "obviously of great interest and importance" and conveyed a different impression from the third cable.

下面是后来的发展：

their resolution originally submitted on December 12, 1950' which viewed with grave concern the situation in the far east, considered that its continuance was likely to endanger the maintenance of world peace and security; and noted the reply of the Central People's Government to the committee's resolution of January 13. Expressing a desire to continue the efforts to secure a cessation of hostilities in Korea and a peaceful settlement of Korean and other far eastern problems, the draft recommended that representatives of France, the United Kingdom, the United States, Soviet Union, Egypt, India and Central Chinese People's Government meet as soon as possible to obtain "all necessary elucida- tions and amplifications" of the Chinese reply and to make "any incidental or consequential arrangements" toward a peaceful settlement of the Korean and other far eastern problems. The first meeting should be held on a date and at a place fixed by the President of the Assembly with the date and place of each subsequent meeting to be fixed by the representatives themselves. The repre- sentatives were to meet in private, to frame their own terms of reference and to advise the Assembly of the result of their consultations as early as possible.

Kingdom, Canada and India had attempted to obtain certain clarifications of the Peking reply to the Assembly resolution. As a result it seemed clear that Peking did not entirely reject the principle of a cease-fire before negotiations, that the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea had been meant to include the so-called Chinese volunteers and that the principles on which the Korean people should settle their internal affairs were to be a matter for discussion at an eventual conference; previously it had appeared that Peking's intentions had been to leave that question entirely to the Koreans. Another important but ambiguous point was whether the Peking government expected its claim torepresentation to be satisfied before discussions actually began. Sir Gladwyn commented that the question was not of admitting China to membership but of the right of the Peking government to be represented as the government of China. That was not a question of morals or behavior but of facts. The United Kingdom considered it essential to continue United Nations efforts to probe the intentions of the Peking government.

ference at Lake Success or New Delhi to meet within a week or ten days of the decision to hold it and to be composed of the United States, United King- dom, France, the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, India and Egypt. Its tasks would be to refer to a special committee the responsibility of arranging for a cease-fire and thereafter to consider the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem on the basis of the principles stated in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the statement of principles of January 11. These negotiations would cover the withdrawal from Korea of all non-Korean armed forces, including, in par- ticular all Chinese armed forces and nationals; all far eastern problems includ- ing the status of the People's Republic. If the Peking government rejected this plan, the comnIittee might then declare it guilty of aggression. Meanwhile the Canadian delegation would support the United States draft for to vote against it or to abstain from voting on it would be deliberately to ignore the fact of the invasion of Korea by China. The Israeli representative (Eban) further suggested that: 1) the Assembly should continue its search for a peace- ful settlement of Korean and far eastern problems; 2) the function of good offices should be entrusted not to three individuals but to an organ of the Assembly appointed by the Peace Observation Commission to report on ways and means of putting the five principles into effect, particularly the cease-fire; 3) the consideration of collective measures should be deferred until the results of the efforts made by the good offices group became known; 4) the statement that the Central People's Government had rejected proposals by the United Nations was controversial and should be amended. All that could be said was that Peking had not ceased hostilities. Ben C. Limb, foreign minister of the Republic of Korea declared that his government could not accept the principles put forward by the Cease-Fire Group. Chinese communists should not par- ticipate in the settlement of the problems of Korea and furthermore, the pro- posed committee, with representatives of the Soviet Union would be doomed to failure exactly like the Joint Commission of the United States and the Soviet Union whose only achievement from 1945 to 1947 had been to deprive the Korean people of their right to unity and independenc.

The twelve sponsors of the joint draft then submitted a second revision pro- posing that at the first meeting of the seven-power conference, the representa- tives should agree on an appropriate cease-fire arrangement in Korea "and after it had been put into effect, they will proceed with their further delibera- tions." The Soviet Union further amended the draft by a provision that as the first step toward a peaceful settlement, the representatives of the sevencountries would, at their first meeting, agree on an appropriate arrangement for a "provisional" cease-fire in Korea, and following that the representatives would "give consideration to appropriate arrangements and methods for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, to ways and means to be recom- mended to the Korean people with a view to the free settlement of the domestic affairs of Korea by the Korean people themselves, to the question of the with- drawal of United States armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan straits in conformity with the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, and to questions relating to the Far East."

As the debate closed, Sir Benegal Rau informed the committee that Peking on January 26 had regarded the joint draft as providing a genuine basis for a peaceful settlement, and on the basis of that draft the People's Government would be willing to cooperate in negotiations for a peaceful settlement. On January 30 voting in the committee took place. The Soviet Union amendment to the twelve-power draft was rejected by a vote of 5 to 38 with 6 abstentions. Mr. Tsarapkin (Soviet Union) then proposed an oral amendment providing the same things but this was again rejected by a vote of 5 to 33 with 8 abstentions. Two earlier USSR amendments, the first, to delete the heading "Intervention of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in Korea" was rejected by a vote of 4 to 42 with 12 abstentions and the second, to provide that the date and place of the first meeting of the proposed seven-power con- ference be fixed by the President of the Assembly was rejected by a vote of 5 to 35 with 18 abstentions. The committee voted on the draft joint resolution in three parts and because all parts were rejected by votes of 18 to 27 with 14 abstentions, 14 to 32 with 14 abstentions and 17 to 28 with 13 abstentions, the resolution as a whole was not voted upon.

1951年2月1日在美国的策动之下，联合国通过了谴责中国的498号决议案：

这一轮的停火协商彻底失败。