席琳
美国人事后认为，长津湖之战，美军赢得实属侥幸，此话不差。
首先，在1982年出版的《朝鲜战争不为人知的故事》这本书中透露，美军在战争开始阶段，并不知道志愿军司令部和九军团的高层指挥官分别是彭德怀和宋时轮，而以为是林彪。所谓知己知彼，百战百胜，不知彼而知己，一负一胜。美军赢的希望，只剩下一半不到。
During the First Phrase Chinese Offensive marine reconnaissance saw many Chinese trucks were on the northern fringes of the Chosin Reservoir. But these trucks were so precious and afforded such superb rocket targets for roaming Corsair fighter craft that the Chinese used them sparingly. Thus, in planning his tactics, the Chinese Commander General Lin Piao was bound by a rigid stricture: His line divisions could fight three to five days before exhausting their food and ammunition. They then had to be replaced with fresh divisions. Had U.S. intelligence paid more attention to the tactics of the Chinese Revolution, a more accurate explanation could have been deduced for the sudden enemy evaporation. 
好在美军五星上将麦克阿瑟的这个误判，在长津湖作战的时候被发现，并被取而代之的后起之秀李奇微将军及时纠正了，才扭转了整个朝鲜战争的战局。
第二，是美军一开始并没有意识到，住在长津湖周围成千上万的北朝鲜老百姓，会扶老携幼，拼死拼活哭天抹泪地追随着美国大兵们一起撤离。这个在亚洲国家特有的剧本，在美军后来撤离西贡的时候，以及最近撤离喀布尔的时候，一而再再而三地上演。这给美军的成建制撤退，造成了很大的负担。也给长期一贯以军民鱼水情自诩的志愿军战士们，造成了极大的困惑。
A pathetic flotsam of war trailed the marines - civilian refugees, thousands of them, women and children and old men, carrying whatever belongings they still owned. They had lived five years under Kim Il Sung. They apparently did not think the Chinese Communists would improve their lives。
事情的转机，在于美军陆战一师的战地指挥官，史密斯将军，敢于抗命，固执己见，如刘玄德过江一般，不弃不离，才转危为安。
Their survival, in the end, was due to General Oliver P. Smith's refusal to be cowed by Generals MacArthur and Almonds - a stubbornness that (also) saved the lives of 10,000 marines.
第三，也就是最为致命的，是美军在整个朝鲜战争期间，竟然使用了错误的地图。在下面这份地图上，因为语言上的原因，美国人把韩国人（Changjin）和日本人（Chosen）关于长津湖的名字，给绕晕了，结果是把同一个地名（Changjin Reservior或者Chosen Reservior），当成了两个不同的地名，标在了相距约100公里的两个不同地点的水库上。这第二个水库的名称，应该是赴战湖（Fusen Revervior或者Pujon-Ho，但不是Chosen Reservior）。这在误炸南联盟中国大使馆的时候，发生过一次，但以美国大兵的操性，那不是第一次，也肯定不会是最后一次。好在长津湖血战的时候，美军是从长津湖撤离，而不是进攻长津湖。所以用错了地图，对战局才没有决定性的影响。
有了以上这三个致命的弱点，美军还能够全身而退，并能在虎嘴里拔牙，不能不说是老天的眷顾。
