本文為作者10-11月在中國考察期間所思所想，有修改。原標題為《From China, With Evy》 (中國所至，艷羨相隨)，典故出自電影《From Russia, With Love》

【文/觀察者網專欄作者 保羅·巴蒂斯塔 】

“智者從別人經驗中汲取智慧” 中國是這條格言的忠實追隨者

“當中國覺醒時，世界將為之震動”。這句據說是拿破崙的名言，已經傳遍了全世界。

如今，中國已經完全覺醒，而其他國家，特別是西方國家，尤其是美國，不知如何應對中國崛起所帶來的挑戰。在西方，由於中國和俄羅斯被視為美歐大西洋軸心國的強大競爭對手，因此受到極大關注。

讀者朋友們，人類的羨慕分為兩種：一種是惡性的，即來自美國和歐洲的羨慕，這導致他們總是試圖阻止中國的進步；另一種是良性的，這種羨慕是欽佩中國的進步，並希望在可能的情況下，加以必要的變通，向中國學習，並將其發展過程中遵循的一些要素融入自身。

寫作本文時我正在中國，我正利用此次在中國的旅行機會，更多地了解這個偉大的國家。

俾斯麥曾說：“愚者從自身經歷總結經驗，智者從別人經驗中汲取智慧。”即便很多中國人可能未曾聽過這句話，但他們是這條格言的忠實追隨者。例如，中國人從拉丁美洲的經歷中汲取的是負面教訓。通過觀察我們的戰略失誤，他們明白了哪些事不該做。

如果要用一句話來總結中國之於拉美的成功，我會說：與拉丁美洲不同，中國摒棄了所謂“華盛頓共識”的建議。她獨立思考，並非常成功地構建了適合本國國情的解決方案。中國在方便時借鑑，在必要時創新。

在開始評論中國成功模式之前，有一點需要說明。我不想假裝基於幾周的旅行，就能對如此複雜且與巴西差異巨大的國家有深入的了解。確實，我曾在上海居住過兩年多，當時我擔任金磚國家新開發銀行的副行長（2015-2017）。但我離開該銀行已有八年，自那以後中國已經發生了巨大變化。

此外，當八年前我在上海的時候，我全身心投入到這家新的多邊銀行（一個雄心勃勃的金磚國家項目）的創建工作中，以至於沒有太多時間來熟悉這個國家的獨特性——正如亨利·基辛格所寫，中國不是一個民族國家，而是一個自成體系的文明。

保羅·巴蒂斯塔（Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr.）

中國過去40年的非凡成功

中國在20世紀末已然覺醒，並且絕不會再倒退到歷史上其他時代的深眠狀態。中國的經濟模式取得了非凡的成功，但世界其他地區對其理解尚不充分。如何概括其特性呢？或許可以從它“不是什麼”管窺一二。

它並非純粹簡單的市場經濟，也就是說，它不是經典或傳統的資本主義體系。甚至像西方學術和新聞媒體中那樣，稱其為“國家資本主義”也未必恰當。國家在經濟和社會中占據着如此壓倒性的地位，以至於這種表述容易產生誤導。

需要指出的是，採用“國家資本主義”這一說法，會不當地將中國成功的功勞歸之於資本主義——即便是“國家的”資本主義——而這一體制對中國成功所起的作用並非如其所指，中國也未曾有過這樣的“國家的”資本主義。

同樣顯而易見的是，由鄧小平於1978年開創的中國模式，與中央計劃經濟時期的蘇聯模式及當時中國的模式都截然不同。

中國所尋求的是重構經濟，為市場和私營部門騰出空間，但同時避免重蹈戈爾巴喬夫在20世紀80年代推行“改革”和“公開性”（政治自由化）時所犯的錯誤。

在審慎評估了蘇聯最後十年及1990年代俄羅斯的發展軌跡後，中國做了（以及沒做）什麼？主要有兩點。

首先，中國的“經濟改革”更為謹慎和漸進。沒有像俄羅斯那樣採取經濟“休克療法”、大規模私有化和急劇自由化。經濟開放是逐步進行的，沒有瓦解國家結構，並保持了對經濟戰略部門的控制。

第二點：中國沒有推行“政治自由化”。中國共產黨仍然是一個單一的、具有廣泛影響力的政黨，對社會和經濟能施加巨大影響。中國有億萬富翁和實力雄厚的私營企業家，但他們不扮演政治角色，也不被允許主導公共政策。

這與美國等國家所見的情景完全不同，在美國，金錢的擁有者即是權力的擁有者，因而所謂的民主已經演變為富豪統治。

另一個重要事實是：反腐敗鬥爭在中國呈現出雷霆之勢，並在必要時觸及顯要和權勢人物。與美國和許多其他國家不同，中國的億萬富翁很難收買政治人物和官員。因此，竊賊統治（由竊賊執政）受到嚴格的屏蔽。

在中國，我們也沒有看到歐美典型的那種“最壞者執政”。在西方，政治體系通常遵循一種“逆向選擇”的邏輯，獎賞那些最為平庸、最不致力於公共利益的人。任何對此有疑問的人，都可以審視一下美國和歐洲當前及近期的政治領導人。或者再考慮一下巴西的政治階層作為另一個例子。

在中國，實行的是一種相對封閉的體系，領導者是基於才能選拔出來的。因此，這是一種精英統治（賢能政治）。可以想見，它並非完美無缺，但足以避免形成“最壞者執政”的風險。

當然，中國人也是凡人，同樣面臨着需要對抗超級富豪的支配、腐敗以及平庸之挑戰。但在應對這些尼采所言“人性的”挑戰方面，中國相比世界其他地區取得了更大的成功。

中國模式

那麼，究竟何為“中國模式”？且讓我們傾聽中國人自己的聲音——他們將其模式界定為“中國特色社會主義”。

他們特意使用“社會主義”一詞，而非蘇聯式或毛澤東時代的“共產主義”。那又為何強調“中國特色”呢？這是因為，儘管市場力量在此扮演重要角色，但它們是在由國家及國家機構與制度嚴格控制的框架內運行的。我在上海參與的一場辯論中，上海交通大學的文一教授引用了一句在中國廣為流傳的俗語，恰如其分地反映了這一點：“國家搭台，經濟主體唱戲”。

試舉兩例簡要說明。中國的銀行體系幾乎完全由國有銀行主導。這裡沒有像巴西占主導地位的大型私人銀行，如布拉德斯科銀行、伊塔烏銀行或桑坦德銀行。中國人不了解也不願了解這類私人主導的金融機構。在中國，從宏觀經濟角度看，銀行業是戰略性部門，始終處於公有銀行的控制之下。另一方面，一個重要之處在於，在政府和中央銀行制定的規則範圍內，這些國有銀行彼此之間相互競爭，這有助於提高效率。

另一個關鍵例子。中國經濟的穩定依賴於封閉的資本賬戶，即嚴格實施資本流入和流出的管制。近期雖有所放寬，但中國仍然不願讓本國經濟暴露於資本大進大出所帶來的風險之下——這種風險對拉丁美洲造成了巨大傷害。這是在眾多議題上，中國對“華盛頓共識”的建議置若罔聞的其中一點。他們以俾斯麥的精神，從我們拉丁美洲的不幸經歷中吸取了教訓。倘若當初他們聽從了西方的建議，就不可能取得如今的成就。

對祖先和歷史傳統的尊崇

最後，簡要談談中國一個至關重要但可惜難以複製的獨特之處。人們很少考慮到，中國數千年的歷史擁有非凡的連續性。世界各大洲的其他多數古老文明，並未擁有中華文明那樣長達四五千年的悠久歷史，且未曾中斷過。今天的埃及，與法老和金字塔時代的古埃及，即便不能說毫無關聯，其聯繫也已非常遙遠甚至近乎虛構。當下的希臘人與古希臘關係也不大。今天的意大利人與古羅馬帝國也相去甚遠。阿茲特克和印加文明則完全被西班牙殖民者所湮滅。俄羅斯的文明延續性大約有一千年。

中國則是一個非常特殊的案例。數千年來，她歷經多次動盪、外敵入侵、對外戰爭、內戰，但儘管如此，她仍成功維繫了一條共同的文化脈絡。在我看來，這體現在中國發展軌跡的某些核心方面，對於理解該國的成功至關重要。

其中之一就是對祖先和歷史傳統的尊崇，乃至敬畏。然而，這種對傳統的尊重並未阻礙新一代的創新和創造力。對新事物的追求無處不在，但這並不意味着要拋棄過去。

延安窯洞時期的毛澤東，《孫子兵法》是他最愛和熟讀的書籍之一

即便是像毛澤東這樣的馬克思主義革命家，也經常引用中國古代思想家如老子和孫子的言論。另一方面，當毛澤東思想被鄧小平及其繼任者直至現任領導人習近平的理論所繼承時，也並未對毛澤東本人進行全盤否定。他的形象至今仍出現在所有面值的人民幣紙幣上；他的著作仍在被廣泛閱讀和流傳。

相比較而言，在巴西，我們不夠尊重，甚至常常不了解我們的過去。這種無知又助長了系統性貶低我們自身歷史的傾向。而這正是拉低我們民族自尊心的眾多因素之一。

向中國學習，我們大有可為

最後有一點需要申明的是：對中國成就的欽佩，並不應妨礙我們看到該國當下面臨的困難。

其中之一是經濟增長的放緩，這源於出口和投資動能一定程度的減弱。針對中國的保護主義日益抬頭，主要在美國和歐洲，導致重要市場不斷收窄甚至關閉，並威脅到其他市場。中國經濟的某些部門出現了過度投資，從而形成閒置產能，而中國已無法像以往那樣輕鬆地將這些產能導向海外市場。

經濟放緩對勞動力市場造成了負面影響。例如，青年失業率高企，便是一個首要的社會和政治問題。

此外，總體消費水平仍然很低，這反映了民眾正在經歷的若干困難，如果這些問題得不到解決，可能會削弱對政府的支持。私人消費被抑制的原因之一在於養老金體系和醫療衛生服務的不足。中國政府已經充分意識到這一問題，並正尋求完善全國性的養老金和醫療衛生體系。

然而，隨着人口老齡化，由於對退休金、養老金、醫療服務及藥品需求的增加，這一問題將變得更為嚴峻。因此，人們繼續大量儲蓄，以盡力確保晚年的生活水準。

由此可見，政府長期追求的目標——即擴大消費者市場，使中國經濟減少對出口動能的依賴——實現起來並非易事。

即便如此，中國在前行的道路上，每逢重要轉折點，都曾面臨類似甚至比這更嚴峻的困難：從1949年、1978年到2008年， 中國人最終都能從容應對。這背後必定有某種特別的韌性，推動中國人民奮發圖強，最終克服困難。

奧斯卡·王爾德曾說：“愛自己，是一場終生浪漫的開始”。這種自愛，對於個人和國家的成功都至關重要。而中國人恰恰深諳此道。但讀者們請注意，這裡說的自愛，並非蔑視他人；是自豪感，而非虛榮或傲慢；是對自身及近親的尊重，但絕不會墮入西方社會那般典型的自私個人主義。

基於這些以及其他諸多原因，我們需要更多地研究中國，增加與中國人民的交流互動。即便需要付出努力去克服語言、文化和地理上的障礙，這也是值得的。我們不必陷入盲目的模仿，始終充分考量我們自身的歷史和政治條件，但確實能從中方汲取大量有益經驗。

（翻頁請看英文版）

From China, with envy

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr.

A phrase attributed to Napoleon went around the world: "When China awakens, the world will tremble." Well, China is totally awake and the other countries, especially the West, and within the West especially the United States, don't know how to deal with the challenge that it poses. In the West, China and, to a lesser extent, Russia are viewed with great concern as powerful rivals for the North Atlantic axis.

There are two types of envy, reader. The evil one, which is that of the US and Europe, leads them to try to stop China's progress all the time. The benign one admires this progress and wants, as far as possible, and mutatis mutandi, learn from the Chinese and incorporate elements of the process they have been following. I'm taking advantage of a trip to China, where I write from, to get to know this great country a little more.

Bismarck said: "I do not learn from experience – only from that of others." The Chinese are faithful followers of this maxim, even if they may not have heard of it. The Chinese have learned, for example, from the Latin American experience, unfortunately in a negative way. By observing our strategic mistakes, they saw what not to do. If I could sum up the issue in one sentence, I would say: China, unlike Latin America, has solemnly ignored the recommendations of the so-called Washington Consensus. It thought on its own and built with great success its own solutions, adapted to national circumstances. The Chinese copied when convenient, innovated whenever necessary.

Before proceeding to comment on the successful Chinese model,  a caveat is in order: I do not pretend to possess in depth knowledge of a country so complex and so different from ours based on a trip of a few weeks. It is true that I lived for more than two years in Shanghai, when I was vice president of the New Development Bank (better known as the BRICS Bank), now headed by former President Dilma Roussef. But it's been eight years since I left the bank, and China has changed a lot since then. Moreover, at the time I lived here, I was so involved in the creation of the new multilateral bank, an ambitious BRICS project, that I had less time than I wanted to familiarize myself with the singularities of a country that, as Henry Kissinger wrote, is not a nation, but a civilization in itself.

China's extraordinary success over the past 40 years

China woke up at the end of the 20th century and will not return to the deep slumber of other historical eras. The Chinese economic model has been extraordinarily successful and is not well understood in the rest of the world. How to characterize it synthetically? Maybe starting with what it is not. It is not a pure and simple market economy, that is, it is not a classic or traditional capitalist system. It is not even appropriate to designate it as "state capitalism", as is often done in Western media, both academic and journalistic. The State has such an overwhelming presence in the economy and society that this expression is misleading. It should be noted that, by adopting it, capitalism is unduly credited, even if "of the State", a merit that it did not have and does not have for China's success.

It is also clear that the Chinese model pioneered by Deng Xiao Ping in 1979 is quite different from the Soviet and Chinese models of the time of the centrally planned economy. What was sought in China was to restructure the economy, making room for the market and the private sector, without repeating, however, the mistakes made by Gorbachev in the 1980s, with Perestroika (economic restructuring) and Glasnost (political liberalization).

What did China do (and did not do), based on a careful assessment of the trajectory of the Soviet Union in its final decade and of Russia in the 1990s? Two things, basically. First, the Chinese Perestroika was much more cautious and gradual. There was not, as in Russia, shock treatment in the economy, mass privatizations and abrupt liberalization. The economic opening was done step-by-step, without dismantling state structures and maintaining control over the strategic sectors of the economy. Second thing: there was no Glasnost in China. The Chinese Communist Party remains a single, all-powerful party with great influence on society and the economy. There are billionaires and powerful private entrepreneurs, but they have no political role and are not allowed to dominate public policies. A totally different scenario from what is seen, for example, in the United States, where the owners of money are the owners of power, converting the so-called democracy into a plutocracy (the government of the wealthy).

Another important fact: the fight against corruption takes on fierce proportions in China and reaches prominent and powerful figures when necessary. Unlike in the United States and many other countries, Chinese billionaires have a hard time buying politicians and officials. Therefore, a kleptocracy (the government of thieves) is not established.

Nor do we have in China the kakistocracy (the government of the worst), typical of the United States and Europe. In the West, the political system generally obeys a logic of adverse selection that rewards the most mediocre and those least committed to the public interest. Anyone in doubt about this, can review current and recent political leaders in the United States and Europe. Or consider, another example, the Brazilian political class. In China, a closed system prevails in which leaders are selected based on merit. A meritocracy, therefore. Imperfect, as one can imagine, but enough to ward off the risk of forming a kakistocracy.

The Chinese are human beings, of course, and they also face the need to fight against the domination of the super-rich, corruption and mediocrity. But they have been more successful than the rest of the world in addressing these "human, all too human" challenges, as Nietzsche would say.

The Chinese model

So, what is the Chinese model? Let's give voice to the Chinese themselves. They characterize their model as "socialism with Chinese characteristics." They symptomatically use the term "socialism" in place of Soviet or Maoist "communism." And why do they say "with Chinese characteristics"? This is because, although market forces have great weight here, they operate within a framework strictly controlled by the State and by state agencies and institutions. A popular maxim in China, quoted by Professor Wen Yi in a debate in which I participated here in Shanghai, reflects this well: "the State sets the stage and economic agents perform".

Two examples, briefly explained. China's banking system is almost entirely dominated by state-owned banks. Here there are no Bradescos, Itaús or Santanders, nothing like the dominant large Brazilian private banks. The Chinese do not know and do not want to know this type of institution. The banking sector is strategic from a macroeconomic point of view and has always been under the control of public banks. On the other hand, an important aspect is that, within the rules established by the government and the central bank, these state-owned banks compete with each other, which favors greater efficiency.

Another crucial example. The stability of the Chinese economy rests on a closed capital account, that is, the strict application of controls on the inflow and outflow of capital. There has been some loosening of controls in the more recent past, but China remains reluctant to expose its economy to the surges in capital inflows and outflows that do so much harm in Latin America. This was one of the many points on which China turned a deaf ear to the recommendations of the Washington Consensus. They learned from our unfortunate experience, in the spirit of Bismarck. If they had been guided by Western advice, they would not have achieved what they did.

Continuity in China's millennial civilization

To conclude, a few remarks on a singularity of China that is crucial, but unfortunately inimitable. It is rarely taken into account that China's millennial history is marked by extraordinary continuity. The great majority the other ancient civilizations of the various continents did not have the long and uninterrupted duration, of four or five millennia, that characterizes the Chinese civilization. The Egyptians have a remote, not to say fictitious, relationship with the Egypt of the pharaohs and their pyramids. The present-day Greeks have little to do with ancient Greece. Today's Italians have little to do with the Roman Empire. The Aztecs and Incas were totally obliterated by Spain. Russia also has a continuous civilization, but on the order of 1000 years.

China is a very special case. It has suffered, over millennia, several turbulences, invasions, foreign wars, civil wars, but it has managed, despite this, to preserve a common cultural thread. This is reflected in some aspects of China's trajectory that are, in my view, central to understanding the country's success. One of them is respect, more than that veneration of ancestors and historical traditions. This respect for tradition does not, however, block the innovation and creativity of the new generations. The search for the new omnipresent, but it does not imply discarding the past.

Even a Marxist revolutionary, such as Mao Zedong, often quoted China's classical thinkers such as Lao Tse and Sun Tzu. He considered the latter's main work, "The Art of War", almost like a second communist manifesto. On the other hand, when Maoism was inherited and carried forward by Deng Xiao Ping and his successors up to the current leader, Xi Jinping, there was no outright rejection of the figure of Mao. It appears to this day on all banknotes. His works are read and circulate widely.

Compare this with Brazil. We do not respect and often do not even know our past. This ignorance feeds the tendency to systematically depreciate our history. And this is one of many factors that bring down our self-esteem.  

We have a lot to learn from the Chinese  

Lastly, it should be clarified that admiration for China's performance should not prevent us from seeing the difficulties that the country faces. I will briefly highlight some of the main macroeconomic challenges, without intending, of course, to exhaust the issue.

One of them is the slowdown in the growth of the economy, resulting from a certain loss of dynamism in exports and investment. Protectionism against China has grown, narrowing or even closing important markets, mainly in the United States and Europe, and threatening to narrow others. In some sectors of the Chinese economy, there has been overinvestment, resulting in unutilized capacity, which China can no longer direct to foreign markets as easily as before.

This slowdown in the economy takes its toll in terms of the labor market. The high rate of youth unemployment, for example, is a social and political problem of the first order. In addition, aggregate consumption is still very low, which reflects several difficulties that the population experiences and that, if not addressed, can erode support for the government. Among the reasons that limit private consumption are the insufficiencies of the pension system and health services. The Chinese government is fully aware of the problem and seeks to improve the national pension and health systems. With the aging of the population, however, the problem becomes more serious, as the demand for retirements, pensions, medical services and medicine increases. Therefore, people continue to save a lot to try to ensure the standard of living in old age. Thus, it is not easy to achieve the government's long-standing goal of increasing the consumer market and making the Chinese economy less dependent on the dynamism of exports.

Nevertheless, at every critical juncture in its forward journey, China has faced similar or even more severe difficulties: from 1949 and 1978 to 2008. Each time, the Chinese people have ultimately managed to navigate these challenges with resilience. Behind this lies a unique kind of tenacity that drives the Chinese people to forge ahead with determination and ultimately overcome adversities.

Oscar Wilde said: "Self-love is the beginning of a long life romance". This self-love is central to individual and national success. The Chinese have this in abundance. But, you see, reader: self-love, and not contempt for others; pride, not vanity or arrogance; respect for oneself and one's immediate family, yes, but without falling into the selfish individualism so typical of Western societies.

For these and other reasons, we need to study China more and increase our interactions with the Chinese. It is worth the effort to overcome linguistic, cultural and geographical barriers. Without falling into slavish imitation, always taking into account our historical and political conditions, we can learn a great deal from them.

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The author is an economist and writer. He was vice president of the New Development Bank, established by the BRICS in Shanghai, from 2015 to 2017, and executive director at the IMF for Brazil and 10 other countries in Washington, from 2007 to 2015. He published the book O Brasil não cabe no quintal de ninguém, second edition 2021, by Editora Contracorrente, and by Editora Contracorrente the book Estilhaços, in 2024.