The Dragon’s Shield: Intricacies of China’s BMD Capability
龙之盾：中国弹道导弹防御能力之迷
A. Vinod Kumar
A.维诺德·库马尔
A. Vinod Kumar is Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.
A.维诺德·库马尔是新德里国防研究与分析研究所的副研究员
Summary
综述
China undertook a BMD test on January 11, 2010,which it claimed was an exo-atmospheric interception.Though Beijing was known to be developing missile defence systems for long,there were very few indicators on how far it has gone in terms of technological prowess.By releasing very few details on the nature of the test,China has left many questions on its actual capability.Nonetheless,the Chinese surge towards a BMD capability will have reverberations throughout Asia.
中国在2010年1月11日进行了一次弹道导弹防御试验，据称此次试验是一次外大气层的拦截试验。虽然人们知道北京在研制导弹防御系统已经很久了，但是究竟其技术实力如何一直没有可供参考的指标。由于发布的信息对此次试验本身的细节描述极少，中国对自己的实际能力留下了太多的谜团。尽管如此，中国弹道导弹防御能力的激增将在整个亚洲地区产生重大的影响。
China’s demonstration of its ballistic missile defence (BMD) capability on January 11, 2009 was anticipated for long,though it came with much lesser shock and awe.Exactly three years ago,China shook the world on January 11, 2007 with the display of its Anti- Satellite (ASAT) capability,by intercepting and destroying a weather satellite in low- Earth orbit.Since then,it was widely expected that China’s next technological breakthrough to be displayed to the world would be its ballistic missile interception capabilities.Though Beijing was known to be developing or improvising missile defence systems for long,there were very few indicators from the Communist state on how far it has gone in terms of technological prowess and sophistication.
中国为其在2009年1月11日进行的弹道导弹防御能力演示进行了长期的准备，尽管这些准备工作产生的震撼效果要小的多。整整三年前，中国在2007年的1月11日通过展示其反卫星的能力（反卫星武器）让全世界感到了震惊，在那一次的试验中中国拦截并摧毁了近地轨道上的一颗气象卫星。从那时起，人们普遍预计中国接下来的技术突破将是向世界展示其对弹道导弹的拦截能力。尽管北京有计划地或者是半路出家进行导弹防御系统的研制早已不是什么秘密，但是一直没有什么来自这个共产国家的迹象表明其在技术实力和技术成熟度上达到了怎样的程度。
The purported exhibit of a BMD system in the 60th anniversary military parade (as described by some reports) was a harbinger of things to come,at least to BMD watchers.While the world watched in awe the fledging missile inventory of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA),very few noticed a BMD system being lined up among the other big-ticket missile systems.Though two surface-to-air (SAM) missiles with theatre defence capabilities of the Hongqi (HQ) series conspicuously led the missile parade,the handful of photographs of what was termed by some reports as a Chinese BMD system was in fact of missile tubes,which were lined up along with Hongqi systems.While they seemingly looked like tubes of the paraded HQ systems,not many analysts could conclude whether new BMD systems were displayed on trucks which carried numbers without any specific nomenclature.
据报道在建国六十周年阅兵式前的一个展览上展出的一套弹道导弹防御系统（如某些报道所述）可以看成是此次事件的一个先兆，至少对于那些弹道导弹防御的观察家来说是这样的。全世界都在用谨慎的目光关注着人民解放军羽翼渐丰的导弹库，很少有人注意到与其它大件导弹系统并排展出的弹道导弹防御系统。由于有两种地对空导弹和具备战区防御能力的红旗（HQ）系列导弹领衔整个导弹方阵，在为数不多的照片中被记者们称之为中国弹道导弹防御系统的东西事实上只不过是一些发射管，它们静静地排列在红旗导弹的行列之中。由于它们从外表上看起来像红旗导弹使用的发射管，很少有分析家可以断定，在这个装载在卡车上、上面没有任何特殊编号的发射管里是否就是新型的弹道导弹防御系统。
True to China’s deceptive strategies and postures,there were few indicators to the existence of a new, exclusive longer-range BMD system, outside the Hongqi series.That Beijing deliberately withheld details of the system involved in the January 11th intercept only added to the ambiguity on the nature and capabilities of the system supposedly used for this intercept – prompting China watchers and military analysts to speculate on the Chinese BMD programme and the permutations of systems and capabilities.
在中国的保密策略和低调姿态下，可以用于确定这个独立于红旗系列地空导弹的新型远程弹道导弹防御系统确实存在的依据并不多。北京故意隐瞒了1月11日实施拦截的系统详情，对试验本身和这套系统假想的拦截对象也采取了模糊处理——这使得中国观察家和军事分析人员对于中国弹道导弹防御项目、这套系统的在其中所处的位置及功能纷纷展开了推测。
On the political side,the January 11th intercept unravelled yet another instance of Chinese hypocrisy on major security issues including space weaponisation and ballistic missile defence.Like the manner in which China conducted the ASAT test in January 2007 after years of activism against weaponisation and military uses of outer space,the BMD intercept also contradicted China’s long-standing opposition to ballistic missile defences and concerns over their potential to trigger regional arms races and instability.Yet,a sense of déjà vu prevails as the Chinese demonstration of a BMD capability was long overdue given its innate ambitions to counter the US-backed theatre missile defence (TMD) deployments in East Asia and the potential implications of the Eastern European BMD deployment on its nuclear deterrent.Though Beijing ostensibly used the US transfer of theatre defence systems to Taiwan as a red herring for the BMD capability demonstration,this could in fact be attributed as a natural chain-reaction.
在政治方面，1月11日的拦截试验揭开了中国在重大安全问题上又一层虚伪的面具，其中包括了太空武器化和弹道导弹防御的话题。就如同中国在激烈反对外层空间武器化和军事化多年之后在2007年1月进行了反卫星试验一样，弹道导弹防御拦截试验也违背了中国长期坚持的反对弹道导弹防御系统、担心引发区域军备竞赛与不稳定的立场。直至目前，一种被普遍认同的看法是中国展示其弹道导弹防御能力反应了长期以来其试图反制美国在东亚地区部署战区导弹防御系统（TMD）的野心，以及针对美国在东欧部署弹道导弹防御系统对抗核威慑的潜台词。虽然表面上北京把美国向台湾提供战区防御系统为由转移此次弹道导弹防御能力试验的话题，但实际上这也是很合理的一个解释。
That China launched the BMD system on the third anniversary of its ASAT test shows that the intent was clear and the launch pre-planned.
中国在其反卫星试验三周年之际进行弹道导弹防御系统试验很显然是有意为之。
Needless to say,just as the US BMD plans in Eastern Europe and TMD deployments in East Asia complicated the deterrence equations vis-à-vis Russia and China,the Chinese demonstration of a purported mid-course or an exo-atmospheric (outside Earth’s atmosphere) interception capability is destined to dramatically alter the strategic equations in the Eurasian region.
勿需多言，当美国针对俄国和中国在欧洲部署弹道导弹防御系统、在东亚部署战区导弹防御系统使得威慑平衡的势态发生复杂变化之际，中国的中段反导试验或者说是外大气层拦截能力将注定要显著改变欧亚地区的战略平衡。
Technology: A Systems Survey
技术：系统综述
A release in the Xinhua website on January 11 said: “China conducted a test on ground-based midcourse missile interception technology within its territory.The test has achieved the expected objective.The test is defensive in nature and is not targeted at any country.” It is quite typical of China to give bare minimum details on a major technological capability demonstration and then leave the rest of the world to do the guessing.The text was accompanied by photographs of four systems without naming the first two.The last two systems were identified as the HQ-9 medium and long-range air-defence system and the HQ-12 air defence missile system.The first two unnamed systems were,in fact, the Russian S-300 PMU-2 and a longer-range ballistic missile system,which could possibly be the DF-21 or DF-25.
新华网在1月11日发布了一条消息说：“中国在其领土内进行了一次陆基中段导弹拦截技术试验。试验达到了预期目标。此次试验是防御性的，不针对任何国家。”这是一个很典型的中国式官腔，它把一次重大的技术能力展示的几乎所有细节统统抹去，给全世界留下无限的遐想。这条消息配了四张反导系统的照片，其中前两张照片没有提供说明文字。后两张带文字说明的照片指明了是HQ-9型中远程防空系统和HQ-12型防空导弹系统。前两个没有命名的防空系统，事实上是俄罗斯的S-300型PMU-2和远程弹道导弹系统，有可能是DF-21或者是DF-25。
Besides the primary information that the test was of a ballistic missile interception,the other significant element in this brief was the reference to “ground-based midcourse” interception,which implied that the system undertook exo-atmospheric interception against a longer-range incoming target.Currently,only a handful systems like the US Aegis Standard Missile-3 (SM-3),the Ground-Based Mid-Course Defence System (GBMDS),and the Theatre High-Altitude Area Defence (THAAD),along with Russian systems like the Gorgon and S-400 have this capability,with the THAAD (100+km range) capable of interception at the threshold of Earth’s atmosphere.The US is developing the GBMDS with its Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) as its flagship mid-course interceptor.A handful of GBIs are deployed in Alaska and California though this system is in the development stage and is not deemed to be fully-operational.Russia is attempting a similar longer-range capability through its S-500.The Chinese claim of a mid-course interception capability at this juncture is thus unique but also intriguing in many respects.
该新闻稿中除了说明此次试验是一次弹道导弹拦截试验之外，另外一个引人注目的信息点就是指出了试验是“陆基中段”拦截，这意味着该系统针对远程来袭目标实施了外大气层的拦截。目前，只有少数系统可以做到这一点，比如美国的宙斯盾标准-3导弹（SM-3），陆基中程防御系统（GBMDS），以及战区高空区域防御系统（THAAD）等，俄罗斯的同类系统有Gorgon和S-400，它们都具备在地球大层边界实施战区高空区域防御拦截的能力（100公里以上高度）。美国正在将其陆基拦截器（GBI）发展为陆基中段防御系统，作为今后中段拦截的主力。尽管还处于研制阶段，尚不能视为具备完全作战能力，还是有少量的陆基拦截器部署在了阿拉斯加和加利福尼亚。俄罗斯正在试图通过S-500获得类似的远程拦截能力。中国人在这个关口声称具备了中段拦截能力不仅显得非同一般，而且在许多方面也是耐人寻味的。
There might be a few questions on whether the interception actually happened in exo- atmosphere as reported.A Pentagon spokesperson confirmed detection of “two geographically separated missile launch events with an exo-atmospheric collision being observed by (US) space-based sensors”.The actual area of speculation then is the system being used for the exo-atmospheric interception which could confirm the Chinese entry into this select league.The fact that the Xinhua release showed photographs of many interception systems reveals a deliberate design to maintain ambiguity on its capability.Adding to this speculation is the assessment that most air/theatre defence systems in Chinese inventory have only endo-atmospheric (within Earth’s atmosphere) range,though China has used a re-designed version of one of its long-range ballistic missile for the ASAT test in outer space in January 2007.
对于是否如报道所声称的是在外大气层发生了准确拦截可能还存在一些问题。五角大楼的一名发言人证实“（美国）天基传感器观察到了两枚来自不同发射位置的导弹在外大气层的碰撞”。随后对这两枚导弹发射位置的推算可以确定此次外大气层的拦截行动是由中国人进行的。新华社发布了许多拦截系统照片的行为事实上是为了掩盖其真实能力而故意放出的烟幕。其证据就是中国现有的绝大多数防空/战区防御系统只具备了内大气层（即地球大气层内）的射程，尽管中国曾在2007年1月的反卫星试验中使用过在远程弹道导弹基础上重新设计的新型火箭。
There are a handful of indigenous air-defence systems in Chinese inventory of the Hongqi series,which have applications ranging from surface-to-air defence to theatre defence.The HQ series itself has had a steady evolution since the late 1960s with over six variants – HQ-1, 2, 9, 12, 15, and 16 - being developed and deployed at various stages.With due application of its mastery in reverse engineering,China has over the years built indigenous systems with technological derivatives based on Soviet/Russian systems and commensurately deployed them alongside advanced versions of imported Russian systems.The early variants like HQ-1 and 2 were derivates of the Russian S-75,with the HQ-2 projecting a range of 34 km and deployed in large numbers around strategic installations.For long,these systems were the air defence mainstay until the arrival of advanced versions of Russian S-300 PMU series,including ALMAZ-PMU/SA-10B/C Grumble;PMU-1/SA-20A Gargoyle A;PMU-2 Favorit/SA-20B Gargoyle B.In fact,the PMU-1 and 2,with their 90-150 km range,gives China potential coverage over Taiwan when deployed along the coastline.Advanced indigenous derivatives of the Hongqi series like HQ-9 and HQ-12,along with the original Russian systems,endowed the PLA with augmented theatre and missile defence capabilities,enabling it to establish a multi-layered Integrated Air Defence (IAD) network.Interestingly,pictures of most of these new-generation variants were listed in the Xinhua release of January 11th.
中国的手里还有国产的红旗系列防空系统，它们承担着从防空到战区防御不同范围的任务。从上世纪60年代起红旗系列本身就一直进行着稳定的改进，现在已经有6种主要型号——红旗1，2，9，12，15，16——曾经、已经或着即将进行部署。通过其拿手的逆向工程的本领，中国多年以来一直在原苏联/俄罗斯系统的技术基础上进行仿制和改进，然后同时部署与进口的俄罗斯系统一样先进的国产版本。诸如早期的红旗-1和2是改进自俄罗斯的S-75，其中红旗-2的射程达到了34公里，被大量用于要地防空。长期以来，这些系统只具备防空能力，直到俄罗斯的S-300PMU系列的先进型号被引进后这种状态才得以改变，同时进口的配套装备还有ALMAZ-PMU/SA-10B/C雷声导弹；PMU-1/SA-20A“石像鬼”A型导弹；PMU-2Favorit/SA-20B“石像鬼”B型导弹等。事实上，PMU的1型和2型，射程以经达到了90-150公里，这使得中国在其海岸线上进行部署时就已经能够覆盖住台湾（注：应该是台湾海峡吧）。先进的仿制型号诸如红旗-9和红旗-12，与原产的俄罗斯系统一起，使得解放军具备了战区及导弹防御的能力，并且能够建立起一个多层次的综合防空（IAD）网络。有趣的是，这些新一代型号的照片大都出现在了新华社1月11日发布的新闻里。
The pattern of acquisition and development of these systems highlights unique traits of the Chinese theatre defence programme.While Russia has shared its TMD mainstays with China to provide a distinct edge to the PLA’s air defence architecture,it had largely withheld such cooperation on longer-range systems,including the exo-atmospheric ones,by abstaining from technology or systems transfer of its primary Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems like the long-range Gorgon (SH-11/ABM-4/51T6) or the shorter range Gazelle (SH-08/ABM-3/53T6).Nor are there any reports which confirm transfer of the recently deployed advanced Russian TMD system – the S-400 Triumf.As a result,current Chinese efforts seemingly focus on acquiring these capabilities through indigenous baseline technological development,and in the process matching longer-range interception capabilities,currently a preserve of US and Russia.In a way,Beijing might have realised the utility of ballistic missile defence and space weaponry in the military element of its rising power profile and posturing.
采购并研究上述系统的模式是中国人战区防御项目非常显著的特点。尽管俄罗斯与中国分享了其战区导弹防御系统的当家装备将解放军防空体系的边界提升到了一个新的高度，但在很大程度上还是在诸如远程系统这样的重点领域进行了保留，其中包括了外大气层拦截技术，其主要的反导导弹（ABM）系统如远程的“蛇发女妖”（SH-11/ABM-4/51T6）和射程稍短一些的“羚羊”（SH-08/ABM-3/53T6）都没有向中国出售或者转让技术。传说中俄罗斯向中国提供先进的S-400型“凯旋”战区导弹防御系统的消息也没有得到进一步的证实。因此，当前看起来中国是通过基于自己的技术研发进行了刻苦攻关，并逐步发展出了远程拦截能力，取得了当前与美俄平起平坐的地位。在某种程度上，北京可能已经意识到在其崛起的大国形象和国际地位中弹道导弹防御和空间武器等军事元素所发挥的作用。
The current generation of Chinese air defence and TMD systems like HQ-9 and 12,besides being derivative augmentations of Hongqi and S-300 variants,are also designed to emulate Russian and American capabilities of that genre.The HQ-9 was developed to provide a long-range SAM capability,distinct from the medium-range capabilities of the HQ-12.With a 90 km range and 27 km altitude,it tries to match the S-300 PMU and the PAC-3.Another advanced version of this system – the FT 2000 - is fitted with anti- radiation seeker,which can be programmed before launch based on characteristics of the intended target.An export version,FD-2000,has also reportedly been made,intended at ‘friendly’ countries.The twist to the tale is that some reports suggest the January 11, 2010 interception could have been done by a HQ-9.If this is indeed the case,and supposing that even an advanced version of the HQ-9 could only have an altitude range of below 50 km and a 90 km coverage range,then the declarations on exo-atmospheric or longer-range mid-course interception could be questionable.
中国军队当前使用的这一代防空及战区导弹防御系统，比如红旗-9和12，除了是对红旗系列和S-300系列的改进之外，其设计目标也是瞄准了美俄的同类系统。红旗-9的研制目的是提供远程防空的能力，有别于提供中程防空能力的红旗-12。红旗-9的射程达到了90公里，射高达到了27公里，基本上与S-300型和爱国者-3型相当。另外一种先进型号——FT2000——装备了反幅射导引头，可以在发射前针对预定目标的特征进行编程。其出口版本，FD-2000，据说也已经完成了研制，计划出售给“友好国家”。一些不明真相的报道认为2010年1月11日进行拦截试验的型号是红旗-9型。如果事实确实如此，我们假设有另外一种红旗-9型的改进型号存在，那么它的射高和射程也不会分别超过50公里和90公里，那么所谓的外大气层或者远程路中段拦截的说法就相当可疑了。
In fact,the HQ-9 only emulates the best of altitude range being provided by Russian TMD systems like S-300 PMU 1 and 2,at around 27-30 km,underlining the fact that none of the Chinese TMD systems could perform an exo-atmospheric interception.The other systems with similar or lesser ranges are the HQ-12 (50 km range and 25 km altitude),which replaced the HQ- 2s;and the HQ-15,which is a Chinese version of S- 300 PMU-1.A largely unexplored system is the HQ-16,supposed to be a surface-to-air missile,about which very few details on actual range and altitude has been disclosed by the Chinese.
事实上，红旗-9型的最大射高只相当于俄罗斯战区导弹防御系统S-300PMU的1型和2型，大约在27-30公里左右，这说明了中国人的战区导弹防御系统没有执行外大气层拦截的能力。与红旗-9型相似或射程稍短的是红旗-12型（50公里的射程和25公里的射高），它主要是用来取代红旗-2型；还有红旗-15型，它是S-300PMU-1的国产版本。还有一个世人知之甚少的红旗-16型，它被认为是一种地空导弹，对于它的射高和射程中国方面没有披露任何的细节。
Interestingly,the HQ-16, without being named or designated,led the missile group in the 60th anniversary parade,probably followed by its missile tubes (trucks listed as 19- 11).Behind them were the HQ-9 tubes (without the missiles being displayed) and the HQ-12 missiles with clear nomenclature listing on the missile bodies.The longer-range Dong Feng (DF) 11 and 15 took up the rear of the missile group parade.The reasons or intentions behind limiting the information on the HQ-16 are unclear.Notwithstanding its heralding of the missile group parade,reports however suggest that the HQ-16 could only be a limited range SAM,derived from the Russian BUK SA-11 Gadfly or SA-17 Grizzly medium range semi-active radar homing SAM,with not more than 30 km range – and thus potentially adding marginal value to missile defence applications.
有趣的是，不为人知的红旗-16型，出现在了建国60周年阅兵的导弹方阵当中，在其后面跟着的可能是它的导弹发射管（卡车上的编号为19-11）。在他们的后面是红旗-9的发射管（导弹本身没有被展示）和红旗-12，红旗-12的型号名称被明确标示在了弹体上。远程的东风（DF）11型和15型位于导弹方阵的后方。对红旗-16型的消息进行封锁背后的原因或者意图还不清楚。根据国庆阅兵中对导弹方阵的说明，红旗-16型只不过是一种射程有限的地空导弹，是在俄罗斯SA-11“牛虻”和SA-17“灰熊”中程半主动雷达制导地空导弹的基础上仿制的，射程不会超过30公里——因此对于导弹防御来说它的意义非常有限。
A tangible conclusion can thus be drawn from this technological spectrum of air and theatre defences that none of these systems were involved in the January 11th intercept, if at all it was an exo-atmospheric interception.Which system then undertook the actual intercept?The natural direction to seek for an answer would be the ASAT test of January 2007,in which a reconfigured Chinese medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) hit a weather satellite in low-earth orbit,which is in the 100-500 km altitude range.Western observers designated the ASAT missile as KS/SC-19,a reconfigured version of the DF- 21C or DF-25.Another variant of this reconfiguration – the Kaituozhe 1 (KT-1) - was known to be the vehicle for China’s commercial space launches.Both these missiles are two-stage missiles with around 1500-1700 km range capable of carrying a 600 kg payload to these distances.Reconfiguring these missiles for a precision hit,especially of a satellite-size target,would not be a tough task,though hitting another missile moving at a higher velocity might be a challenging endeavour.The PLA was known to have attempted this mission first at a North Western desert in March 2006.If assumed that this was the same system used for the January 2007 ASAT test,it could also be concluded that this would be the only system in the Chinese inventory that could have undertaken an exo-atmospheric interception in January 2010.
有鉴于此，可以从技术的角度得出一个结论，如果真的发生了大气层外的拦截，以上这些导弹系统都没有参与到1月11日的防御拦截行动，那么实施实际拦截的到底是哪一个导弹系统呢？从2007年1月的反卫星试验去寻找答案是一个很合理的方向，在那次试验中一枚重新设计的中国中程弹道导弹（MRBM）击中了近地轨道上的一枚气象卫星，当时这枚卫星的高度范围是100-500公里。西方观察家们将这枚反卫星导弹编号为KS/SC-19，它改进自DF-21C或者DF-25。它的另外一种改进型号“开拓者1型”（KT-1）被用于中国商用空间发射的载具。这两种导弹都是射程为1500-1700公里、有效载荷为600公斤的两级火箭。对这样的导弹进行命中精度改进，对卫星大小的目标进行针对性打击，并不算是一个特别艰巨的任务，尽管要想击中另一个高速飞行的导弹可能是另外一回事。人们知道中国人民解放军首次试图掌握这项能力的尝试开始于2006年3月的西北大漠。如果它与2007年1月反卫星试验所使用是同一个系统，那么我们也就可以得出结论，认为它就是2010年1月进行外大气层拦截的中国人手中唯一可用的系统。
Chinese Responses to US BMD
中国对美国弹道导弹防御的回应
Despite its vehement opposition to space weaponisation and missile defences,it was clear that China would initiate commensurate actions to strengthen its deterrent capability by improvising alternate or secondary response systems to the US missile defence.As a natural consequence,western observers felt,China would build more warheads and incrementally augment its offensive missile forces in an attempt to overwhelm the US missile defences.A parallel expected measure was development of passive counter-measures,including penetration aids,anti-simulation (disguise the warhead with a camouflage) and decoy technologies,among others.In fact,China was known to have integrated penetration aids during the flight test of the DF-31 ICBM in August 1999.Another key strategy on which the PLA was expected to heavily rely on is the concerted integration of Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology in its longer-range ICBMs,against which ABMs are deemed to be largely impotent.
尽管中国对太空武器化和导弹防御系统持强烈反对的立场，但是很明显中国将展开相应的行动，通过当前或者将来的相应系统加强对美国导弹防御系统的威慑能力。作为一个很自然的结果，西方观察家认为，中国将制造更多的核弹头，并逐步扩大其进攻性导弹力量，以压倒美国的导弹防御系统。被动反制能力的研发是另一种可能的手段，此外还包括突防技术、抗仿真技术（用迷彩伪装弹头）和诱饵技术，等等。事实上，在1999年8期间DF-31洲际弹道导弹的飞行试验中，外界就已知道中国掌握了综合突防技术。解放军期盼取得突破的下一个关键技术在于将多弹头独立再入载具（MIRV）与其远程洲际弹道导弹术的整合，这一技术的整合成功将使得反导系统的作用变得无足轻重。
Such efforts notwithstanding,the Chinese interest in tit-for-tat responses to the US BMD through similar systems was never underestimated even before the ASAT test.In fact,Beijing hinted about its intentions to develop a ballistic missile defence capability at the Zhuhai Air Show in November 2006 where the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation displayed a conceptual ballistic missile defence system.Months later,through the ASAT test,China implicitly proved its capability for exo-atmospheric targeting and interception.The technical features of the ASAT missile test including the use of phased array radar and kinetic-kill vehicle are similar to the templates of a ballistic missile intercept,though the challenge of precision targeting and hitting would be higher for BMD systems.Hence,from the technology demonstration perspective,the January BMD test could be seen as a consequential progression from the ASAT technological template.With its ballistic missile defence intentions (as well as capability) being unequivocally pronounced,the next major breakthrough could be on kill vehicle technology – especially kinetic and directed energy weapons.
无论怎样，对于中国人针锋相对地掌握类似美国弹道导弹防御系统的兴趣绝不可以低估，反卫星试验亦是如此。事实上，早在2006年11月的珠海航展上中国就已经表示出了发展弹道导弹防御能力的意图，在那次航展上中国航天科工集团公司展示了弹道导弹防御系统的概念。几个月之后，通过反卫星试验，中国从侧面验证了其外大气层的瞄准和拦截能力。反卫星导弹试验所使用的重点技术包括相控阵雷达和动能拦截器，弹道导弹的拦截技术可以以其为模板，不同之处在于反导系统对于瞄准和命中的精度要求要高出许多。因此，从技术论证的角度看，一月份的弹道导弹防御试验可以被看成是对反卫星技术模板的发展进步。随着其弹道导弹防御意图（以及能力）的公开，接下来的突破重点应该是在杀伤载具技术——尤其是动能及定向能武器。
In fact,China’s kinetic kill-vehicle (KKV) capability has already been demonstrated through the January 2010 test.In its improvisation efforts,China might focus on smaller KKVs for ASAT application and on exo-atmospheric high-velocity KKVs for its longer- range BMD systems.However,the domain where China would attempt to challenge the US would be directed energy interceptors (DEI) or high-energy laser weapons (HEL),though not exactly following US models like the Airborne Laser (ABL).China is known to have initiated research in HEL since 1980s,probably as a response to the US Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI).As part of the ‘National 863’ programme for high-technology development,Beijing was known to have sanctioned R&D efforts on HEL medium including deuterium fluoride chemical lasers,free-electron lasers (FEL),hydrogen fluoride chemical lasers and x-ray lasers,among others.The unique nature of this exploration is the correlation between aspirations and actual development capabilities.Despite struggling for decades on rudimentary air defence,China had sought to make inroads into advanced and futuristic technologies like DEI or exo-atmospheric KKV.That it pursues these technologies with perseverance reflects well on its power aspirations.Consequently,it is obvious that China would now emerge as the primary competitor on BMD and ASAT technologies to the US in coming decades.Considering that it would be a strongly-contested race for ascendancy in futuristic technologies,this competition will have major political ramifications.
事实上，中国动能拦截器（KKV）的能力已经在2010年1月的试验中得到了验证。在其当前的努力方向上，中国可能更关注于反卫星武器上动能杀伤器的小型化和远程反导系统使用的外大气层高速动能杀伤器。然而，中国将对美国发起挑战的主要领域还是在定向能拦截器（DEI）或者高能激光武器（HEL），它们将不再跟随美国人空基激光平台的模式（ABL）。众所周知，中国对于高能激光的研究开始于20世纪80年代，这个研究项目的展开可能是作为对美国战略防御计划（SDI）的回应。作为国家863计划高科技研发的一个组成部分，可以相信北京手里有一批关于高能激光的可靠的研究成果，其中包括了氟化氘化学激光器，自由电子激光器（FEL），氟化氢化学激光器和X射线激光器，等等。这种探索性研究的独特之处就在于它是联结愿望与实际研发能力之间的纽带。在基本的防空能力苦苦支撑了几十年之后，中国开始寻求进入诸如定向能拦截或者外大气层杀伤拦截这样的未来先进技术的殿堂。她以坚定的愿望和极大的毅力对这些技术展开追逐。因此，很明显在未来几十年内，中国在弹道导弹防御技术和反卫星技术方面将成为美国的主要竞争对手。考虑到这将是一场对于未来技术优势的激烈竞争，这一竞争将会带来重大的政治影响。
Political and Security Implications
政治及安全方面的意义
When the Eastern European BMD plan was announced by the Bush administration,both Russia and China staunchly opposed it citing a negation of their nuclear deterrence.China had felt the heat on both flanks,with its minimum deterrence also violated by the East Asian theatre defence deployments in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.The challenge to its missile inventory from Taiwanese defences could disarray Chinese calculations.A majority of the reports after the January 2010 demonstration cited the recent arms transfers to Taiwan as a rationale for the BMD test.However, what was puzzling about this assertion was the question whether a country would spontaneously project a military capability merely as a riposte to a political event.By doing so,will such technology demonstration not confirm that the capability actually pre-existed and that the event was only a catalyst?In China’s case,it was obvious that the capability existed since the ASAT demonstration in January 2007 and intentions pronounced months before through the concept display in November 2006.
当布什政府宣布东欧弹道导弹防御计划时，俄罗斯和中国坚决反对，理由是它将打破核威慑的平衡。中国在两个方向上都倍感压力，其最低限度的核威慑也因为东亚战区防御系统在日本、韩国和台湾的部署而受到挑战。台湾地区的防御部署将对进攻方的导弹数量形成挑战，这将打乱中国人的计划。在2010年1月的试验之后，多数的新闻报道认为之前不久的向台湾提供导弹防御武器是此次弹道导弹防御试验的原因之一。但是，这个结论有一个问题，即一个国家是否会主动展示其军事能力来作为对一个政治事件的回应。如果是这样的话，这此技术展示是不是仅仅是对之前已经具备的能力的试验而已？售台武器事件是不是只是一个催化剂？就中国的情况而言，很明显在200年1月的反卫星试验和之前几个月即2006年1月的概念展示之后，她就具备了这样的技术能力。
Indeed,since the late 1990s,there were sufficient indications that China could come up with suitable responses to the US National Missile Defence (NMD) project of Clinton years,which also envisaged the East Asian TMD.The Chinese government, along with its media and think tanks,have constantly attacked the US BMD plans through a persistent spotlight on their destabilising impact on global and regional security,with potential for triggering arms races as well as their inherent implications for nuclear deterrence equations.One such critique by the PLA Daily,after the announcement of the Eastern European BMD deployment plan,termed the development of the US ABM system as aimed at “changing the ‘mutually assured destruction’ nuclear deterrent concept left over from the Cold War,” through a “weakening of the enemy’s nuclear missile deterrent,thus achieving ‘attack through defense’.” China also highlighted the proliferation quotient by citing the Russian test of the Topol ICBM system as a direct arms race consequence of the US BMD plans.By making this specific mention of the Russian action,Beijing was implicitly making a veiled reference to its own preparations for similar responses.
事实上，自20世纪90年代后期以来，有足够的迹象表明，中国已经对克林顿时代的美国国家导弹防御系统（NMD）作出了相应的反应。其针对的目标就是东亚地区的战区导弹防御系统。中国政府与其喉舌、智囊团一道，长期以来不断的以将对全球与区域安全产生不稳定影响为由，对美国的弹道导弹防御计划加以攻击，认为其存在触发军备竞赛和破坏核威慑平衡的潜在可能。《解放军日报》的一篇批判文章，在东欧弹道导弹防御的部署计划公布后，指出美国对反导系统的研制是在企图通过“削弱对方核导弹的威慑力量”、“改变冷战以来确保‘互相摧毁’的核威慑势态”，从而达到‘以守为攻’的目标。中国还将俄罗斯试射白杨洲际弹道导弹系统作为美国弹道导弹防御计划导致军备竞赛程度加剧的一个例子加以强调。在特意提到俄罗斯的这一举动之后，北京也不声不响地开始着手做出与之类似的反应。
The Chinese ASAT, when viewed in this context, is an asymmetric response to the US plans in space,with Beijing treating even the American BMD,especially systems like the GBMDS, as a space weapon capability.This logic explains the Chinese urge to graduate from air defence systems to an exo-atmospheric capability which can countervail US supremacy in this spectrum.Beyond the space competition,Beijing’s concerns on the devaluation of its nuclear deterrent by the US BMD also stems from the fact that China’s no-first-use (NFU) policy places a disadvantage on its nuclear deterrent even when US gains a force multiplication through its missile defences, which will strengthen or ensure survival of its first and second strike systems.Further,a direct mitigation effect of US BMDs could be on China’s long-range strike capability,like its ICBMs which supposedly has the range to reach US shores.For,China believes even a limited US BMD can neutralize its limited strength of ICBMs capable of hitting US territory.The TMD presence in East Asia,and a potential BMD deployment in Europe,adds to this neutralising effect on its strategic deterrence and regional supremacy as its response options are heavily constrained in the event of a conflict.Missile defences surrounding its hinterland restrict China to two strategic options: (a) launch on warning of threat as a first strike or (b) negate the intensity of such threats through missile defences even while preparing its offensive forces for a second strike.With its pledge of a NFU doctrine,China now has its stakes on the second option as an equitable balance that can mitigate the potential of (or restrain from) a forced first strike.Missile defences thus becomes imperative for China’s strategic dominance.
话说到这里，中国的反卫星试验可以看成是对美国太空计划的一个不对称回应，从那次试验后北京开始对美国的弹道导弹防御形成了威胁，从作为一种空间武器的能力上来说，这个反卫星系统与陆基弹道导弹防御系统是非常相似的。这种逻辑很好地解释了中国对于将防空系统升级到外大气层级别从而抵消美国在这一领域的优势地位的渴望。除了空间竞争，北京对于自己的核威慑力量在美国弹道导弹防御面前的缩水的担忧还源于其不首先使用核武器的政策，这一政策使得美国导弹防御系统的作用倍增、中国核威慑的劣势更为不堪，导弹防御系统将使核打击和核反击的力量更为强大、生存性更高。此外，弹道导弹防御系统可以直接缓解中国远程打击能力的威胁，因为中国洲际导弹的射程只能打到美国的西海岸。因此，中国相信哪怕是有限的弹道导弹防御系统也可以将这些不多的可以打击美国本土的洲际导弹抵消掉。战区导弹防御系统在东亚的存在，以及可能在欧洲部署的弹道导弹防御，一起抵消了中国战略威慑的效果以及在地区冲突事件当中的优势地位，中国在此类事件发生时可以打的牌将变得非常少。环绕中国的导弹防御系统使得中国只剩下两个战略选择：（a）在战争信号出现时先发制人或（b）通过导弹防御来抵消掉受威胁的强度，同时准备进行核反击。因为奉行不首先使用核武器的政策，中国现在把所有的牌都押在了第二个选项上，以寻求继续自己的核反击政策。导弹防御系统因此而成为中国保持其战略优势而势在必行的选择。
The accumulating fear of subjection had forced Beijing to not just invest on countermeasures development and space engagements,but also expand its range of options across a wide array of defensive systems for a multi-tier architecture to complement its offensive forces.In effect,this could be a replica of the US and Russian defensive models.Much like the Pentagon lingo,China too calls this its ‘active defence’ strategy,which it has reiterated in all its Defence White Papers since 2000.While noting that “China adheres to its military strategy of active defense,” the 2004 White Paper directly attacks the US BMD efforts and its permeation in China’s neighbourhood,including Japan and Taiwan.The 2008 White Paper again reiterates reliance on active defence,and asserts that “strategically, China adheres to the principle of featuring defensive operations, self-defence and striking and getting the better of the enemy only after the enemy has started an attack.In response to the new global trends in military developments and the requirements of the national security strategy,China has formulated a military strategic guideline of active defence for the new period.” This is a clear indication of the pursuit of offensive-defensive models (a format BMDs have now metamorphosed into),with the rationale that this is only to negate the advantage to a first striking enemy – a logic propounded by all BMD-pursuing countries.
对于俯首听命的恐惧迫使北京不单只对反制措施和空间竞争加大了投资，同时也在扩充手里除了进攻性力量之外的可用之牌，其内容包括了多层次架构下的防御系统组合。实际上，这种组合就是美俄防御模式的翻版。就像五角大楼的行话一样，中国也将其称为‘主动防御’战略，这种说法从2000年开始在其国防白皮书中出现。尽管在白皮书中指出“中国坚持其积极防御的军事战略”，2004年版的国防白皮书还是对美国在建立弹道导弹防御系统上的努力以及对中国周边国家和地区的渗透进行了点名的批评，这些国家和地区包括了日本和台湾。2008年版的白皮书再次重申了中国对积极防御战备的坚持，并且做出了以下结论：“在战略上坚持防御、自卫和后发制人的原则。适应世界军事发展的新趋势，依据国家安全和发展战略的要求，中国制定了新时期积极防御的军事战略方针。”上述容态是中国开始追求主动防御模式的一个明确表态（在这里弹道导弹防御的内容已经变相包括在了其中），它的理由只是为了抵消敌人首先发动打击的优势——这也可以成为所有想发展弹道导弹防御系统的国家的借口。
The greater intricacies of missile defences – of creating a domino competitive effect - come into play at this juncture.With the US BMD triggering tit-for-tat responses from Russia,and subsequently China,a surge towards missile defence capability by China will have reverberations throughout the Asian region.Beyond the domino effect,a plausible explanation would be the existence of a security dilemma in this region.For example,Taiwan had suggested the increasing presence of Chinese tactical missiles in its coastline,entwined with its space postures,as a factor for demanding US arms supplies including Patriot systems.The Chinese build-up, along with North Korean nuclearisation,had convinced its East Asia neighbours to deploy US BMD systems.On the other hand,China seeks to augment its options in outer space and exo-atmospheric defence citing influx of US BMD in the region – thus prompting a “which is the chicken and which is the egg” question.Both sides justify their security deficits and dilemmas created by the rival’s actions,thus adding to an inequitable and unstable equation.
这种情况下导弹防御问题的复杂性就更为突出了——它将带来多米诺骨牌的竞争后果。美国人的弹道导弹防御导致了俄罗斯人针锋相对的反应，然后中国也跟进了，中国在导弹防御能力上的快速提升将对整个亚洲地区产生重大影响。除了多米诺骨牌效应，这一地区在安全问题上存在的困境也是一个说得通的理由。例如，台湾就提出中国在其沿海地区增加了战术导弹的部署数量，加上其在空间技术上的优势地位，是台湾向美国购买包括爱国者系统在内的更多武器的原因。中国军力的提升，还有北朝鲜的核问题，成为说服其东亚邻国部署美国弹道导弹防御系统的原因。另一方面，中国寻求扩大其在外层空间和外大气层的防御能力引发了美国弹道导弹防御系统在该地区的涌入——这是一个“鸡生蛋，蛋生鸡”的问题。双方都以自己的安全问题为由为自己的行为进行开脱，都把自己的行动归咎于对方，从而加剧了安全局势的不平衡和不稳定。
Thence,the Chinese actions and postures,and the strategic arms competition in East Asia,has a domino effect on South Asia as well.For example,the Indian BMD venture is seen as a means to counter Chinese MRBMs supposedly deployed in Tibet,along with the inherent threat from Pakistan’s fledging ballistic missile capability.India thus ends up in a situation like China with nuclear armed rivals posing a challenge to its nuclear deterrent,thus encouraging it to creating a defensive layer that mitigates a nuclear first strike from its rivals.This sets off a chain reaction in South Asia as Pakistan now feels its nuclear deterrence against India will be ineffective if India develops a counter to its delivery vehicles.Though Pakistan is not known to pursue technological development or acquisition beyond air defence systems,the day is not far when it would seek longer-range and higher-velocity ballistic missile defence systems from its ‘all- weather friend’ China or from other sources.
到目前为止，中国人的行动和姿态，以及整个东亚地区的战略武器竞赛，已经在南亚地区产生了多米诺骨牌效应。例如，印度在弹道导弹防御系统上的投资可以看成是对中国可能在西藏部署中程弹道导弹的一种对策，同时也是对可能来自巴基斯坦初步具备的弹道导弹能力的戒备。印度和中国一样，结束了可以用自己的核武器向对手产生威慑的时代，这使得印度决心建立起自己的保护伞来减轻对手首轮打击的压力。如果印度研制出了导弹防御系统，当巴基斯坦感觉到其对印度的核威慑将失效时，南亚地区的连锁反应就开始了。尽管还不知道巴基斯坦是否展开相关技术的研究，或者寻求采购外层防御系统，但是它从其‘全天候伙伴’中国或者其它国家寻求远程高空弹道导弹防御系统的那一天并不会很遥远。
Conclusion
结论
Missile defences were initially seen as an ideal way out of the Mutually Assured Destruction trap.While threats of assured destruction and massive retaliation have primarily guided deterrence equations between nuclear powers,the propriety of leaving space for mutual vulnerability is now finding few takers.A nuclear weapon state,backed by a BMD shield,is perceived to have a natural advantage through its ability to offset first-strike from the enemy through its defences,while also ensuring survivability of its assured destruction/massive retaliation capability through a second strike.As a result,instead of creating stability,the shift from offensive to defensive postures through BMDs has produced a contrarian effect,one which postulates competition for interception capabilities that could consequently trigger arms races rather than containment of proliferation.
导弹防御系统最初被看作是打破确保相互摧毁这一僵局的理想办法。虽然确保相互毁灭以及大规模报复是核大国之前保持威慑平衡的主要方式，但是脆弱的共同生存空间这一漏洞使得这种方式在当今的世界不再有市场。一个核武器国家，再加上弹道导弹防御的盾牌，才有资格声称具备通过防御来抵销来自敌人的首轮打击、占据主动地位的能力，只有这样才能确保其实施大规模报复的核反击力量的生存性。因此，与带来稳定恰恰相反，通过弹道导弹防御带来的从进攻到防御的变化产生了一个完全相反的后果，一个被认为加入发展拦截能力的国家将引发而不是遏制军备竞赛。
