【文/周波，翻译/观察者网 杨瑞赓】

今年4月，中国政府派国务院副总理刘鹤访美，以解决中美之间的贸易争端问题。但在一次介绍贸易谈判进展的白宫椭圆形办公室新闻发布会上，特朗普总统突然改变了话题：“在俄罗斯、中国和美国之间，我们都在制造包括核武器在内的价值数千亿美元的武器，这很荒谬。”自那以后，特朗普总统下令其政府准备推动与俄罗斯和中国达成新的美俄中军备控制协议。

如果刘鹤副总理对话题突然从贸易转到军备控制感到意外的话，那么他并不是唯一对此感到惊讶的人。对于中国人而言，特朗普总统的说法毫无道理。据斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所的数据显示，美国和俄罗斯拥有世界上90%的核武器，而中国拥有的核弹头（290枚）少于法国（300枚）。

瑞典斯德哥尔摩和平研究所公布2019年全球核弹头数据（制图：SIPRI）

难怪中国国防部对美国、俄罗斯和中国就军备控制达成三方协议的想法嗤之以鼻。要想达成这样的协议，除非美国和俄罗斯都将各自的核武库降低到中国的水平，或者中国大幅增加核武库达到美国和俄罗斯同等规模——这两种情况都不现实。

目前，特朗普政府正在增强美国的核能力，开发用于潜射弹道导弹的低当量弹头和在战场上使用的战术核武器。俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京于2018年3月宣布，莫斯科正在研制一种拥有“无限射程和无限机动能力”的核动力巡航导弹。

由于中国承诺不首先使用核武器，只保持精干有效的核威慑，它必须拥有较多的陆基中程导弹，以实现与其他核大国之间的战略平衡。换句话说，如果中国减少其大部分受中导条约限制的陆基中程导弹数量，就必须大幅提高其核打击能力。对西方来说，两“害”相权，哪个轻?

中国对核裁军并未置身事外。1994年，中国向当时核俱乐部的其他四个国家即法国、俄罗斯、美国和英国提交了一份不首先使用核武器的草案。在印度和巴基斯坦于1998年进行核试验后，中国和美国同意不再将各自的核导弹瞄准对方。其他核国家于2000年纷纷效仿。

我们真的需要像特朗普总统建议的那样，再签订一个无效的核裁军条约吗?

《不扩散核武器条约》（Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons）只承认1967年1月以前进行核试验的国家为有核国家，但未能阻止印度、以色列和巴基斯坦——更不用说朝鲜——成为事实上的拥核国家。

2017年的《禁止核武器条约》（Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons）反映了人们对“核裁军进程缓慢”的失望，这是可以理解的，但它可能并不会生效。到目前为止，只有23个国家批准了该条约，距离使其生效的50国门槛差距不小。具有讽刺意味的是，连唯一受到过核打击的日本也拒绝加入该条约，声称该条约毫无用处。

如果华盛顿和莫斯科想要生活在一个核武器更少的世界，它们就需要在这个问题上发挥带头作用，削减各自的核武库规模。但这种情况发生的前景似乎遥不可及。美国将于8月2日退出《中导条约》。朝鲜拒绝在没有安全承诺的情况下做出哪怕只是表面的让步，如果伊朗决定制造核武器，沙特阿拉伯也会效仿。在那之后，埃及和土耳其的多米诺骨牌可能也会接着倒下。

全世界的核弹头数量已从上世纪60年代中期冷战高峰期的约6.5万枚下降到2019年初的13865枚。这个进步不是偶然取得的。它需要勇敢的领导人做出明智的决定。

中央军委国际军事合作办公室安全合作中心主任周波7月31日在华尔街日报发文，指责美国无理要求中国核裁军

（观察者网杨瑞赓译自《华尔街日报》，翻页阅读英文原文。）

Zhoubo：It’s Absurd To Ask China To Disarm

The Chinese government sent Vice Premier Liu He to the U.S. in April with a brief to settle the tariff war between Beijing and Washington. But during an Oval Office news conference to address the progress of trade negotiations, President Trump abruptly changed the subject: “Between Russia and China and us, we’re all making hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of weapons, including nuclear, which is ridiculous.” Mr. Trump has since ordered his administration to prepare a push for new arms-control agreements with Russia and China.

If Mr. Liu was surprised by the pivot from trade to arms control, he wasn’t alone. To Chinese ears, Mr. Trump’s claims make no sense. Between them, the U.S. and Russia possess 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons. China has fewer nuclear warheads (290) than France (300), according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

No wonder China’s Ministry of National Defense essentially laughed at the idea of a three-way deal on arms control involving the U.S. and Russia. For such an agreement to work, either the U.S. and Russia would need to bring their nuclear arsenals down to China’s level, or China would need to increase the size of its arsenal drastically. Neither scenario is realistic.

At the moment, the Trump administration is building up U.S. nuclear capability, developing low-yield warheads for submarine-launched ballistic missiles and tactical nukes for use in battlefield situations. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced in March 2018 that Moscow is developing a nuclear-powered cruise missile with “unlimited range and unlimited ability to maneuver.”

Since China has pledged no first use of nuclear weapons and only seeks a small and effective deterrent force, it has to keep a larger arsenal of ground-based intermediate-range missiles for strategic equilibrium with other nuclear powers. In other words, if China reduces the number of its ground-based intermediate-range missiles, most of which are subject to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, it has to increase its nuclear-strike capabilities massively. Which is the “lesser evil” for the West?

China is no stranger to nuclear disarmament. In 1994 China presented a draft of a no-first-use policy to France, Russia, the U.S. and the U.K.—the four other countries in the nuclear club at the time. After India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998, China and the U.S. agreed to point their nuclear missiles away from one another. Other nuclear powers followed suit in 2000.

Do we really need another ineffective nuclear-disarmament treaty, as Mr. Trump suggested? The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons only recognizes the nuclear powers that conducted tests before January 1967. It hasn’t prevented India, Israel and Pakistan—not to mention North Korea—from becoming de facto nuclear states. The 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons understandably reflects frustration over “the slow pace of nuclear disarmament,” but it probably won’t come into effect. So far only 23 nations have ratified the treaty, which requires 50 to go into force. Ironically, Japan refuses to join. The only country to have suffered a nuclear attack claims to see no use in the treaty.

Washington and Moscow need to take the lead on this issue and reduce the size of their nuclear arsenals if they want to live in a world with fewer weapons. The prospect of this happening appears remote. The U.S. is set to withdraw from the INF treaty on Aug. 2. North Korea refuses to make even superficial concessions without the promise of an economic payoff, and if Iran decides to go for a bomb, Saudi Arabia will follow. Dominoes in Egypt and Turkey would likely fall after that.

The number of nuclear warheads in the world has fallen from about 65,000 at the peak of the Cold War in the mid-1960s to 13,865 at the start of 2019. That’s progress but it didn’t happen by accident. It required brave leaders to make smart decisions.