非同寻常的忠诚 Extraordinary Fidelity

 

——两名中情局间谍在中国的二十年

 

Nicholas Dujmovic

 

作者：Nicholas Dujmovic

 

“Shot down on their first operational mission, Downey and Fecteau spent two decades in Chinese prisons.”

 

“唐尼和费克图第一次执行任务即被击落，从此在中国监狱里度过了20年。”

 

This article draws extensively on operational files and other internal CIA records that of necessity remain classified. Because the true story of these two CIA officers is compelling and has been distorted in many public accounts, it is retold here in as much detail as possible, despite minimal source citations. Whenever possible, references to open sources are made in the footnotes.

 

本文参考了大量中情局内部仍未解密的有关行动文件和其他记录。这两名中情局官员的真实故事本身非常引人注目，但在许多公开记述中有所误报。因此尽管能够公开引证的资料非常有限，我还是力争在这里做到尽量详实。在有公开资料可以佐证的地方，我都用脚注的方式表明了出处。5

 

Beijing’s capture, imprisonment, and eventual release of CIA officers John T. Downey and Richard G. Fecteau is an amazing story that too few know about today. Shot down over Communist China on their first operational mission in 1952, these young men spent the next two decades imprisoned, often in solitary confinement, while their government officially denied they were CIA officers. Fecteau was released in 1971, Downey in 1973. They came home to an America vastly different from the place they had left, but both adjusted surprisingly well and continue to live full lives.

 

中央情报局人员约翰·T·唐尼（John T. Downey）和理查德·G·费克图（Richard G. Fecteau）在中国被捕、被监禁，并被最终释放的经过，是一段在今天已鲜为人知的传奇故事。这两名年轻人在1952年首次执行任务时，便在红色中国的境内被击落。在接下来的20年里他们一直被关在监狱里，而且经常是被单独囚禁。但是美国政府在正式场合却一直否认他们是中情局人员。费克图于1971年被释放，唐尼则在1973年被释放。他们返回故乡时，美国已经和他们离开时完全不同。不过他们俩人都调整得非常好，至今仍过着充实的生活。

 

Even though Downey and Fecteau were welcomed back as heroes by the CIA family more than 30 years ago and their story has been covered in open literature—albeit in short and generally flawed accounts— institutional memory regarding these brave officers has dimmed.[1] Their ordeal is not well known among today’s officers, judging by the surprise and wonder CIA historians encounter when relating it in internal lectures and training courses.

 

虽然30年前，唐尼和费克图被中情局大家庭作为英雄欢迎回来，并且他们的故事已经在公开的文献上被报道过（通常这些报道都是寥寥几句，而且叙述有误），但中情局内部对这两位勇士的记忆从整体上已变得有些陌生[1]。当中情局的历史学者们在内部讲座和培训课上讲起他俩的经历时，遇到的反应通常是惊讶和怀疑。由此可见，他们所经受的苦难对如今的中情局人员来说已经相当陌生。3

 

This story is important as a part of US intelligence history because it demonstrates the risks of operations (and the consequences of operational error), the qualities of character necessary to endure hardship, and the potential damage to reputations through the persistence of false stories about past events. Above all, the saga of John Downey and Richard Fecteau is about remarkable faithfulness, shown not only by the men who were deprived of their freedom, but also by an Agency that never gave up hope. While it was through operational misjudgments that these two spent much of their adulthood in Chinese prisons, the Agency, at least in part, redeemed itself through its later care for the men from whom years had been stolen.

 

这个故事在美国情报史上占有重要的一席之地，因为它展示了行动的风险性（以及行动失误造成的恶果），也展示了忍受磨难所需要的性格品质。而且它还表明，不断重复为掩盖过去事件而捏造出的故事，有可能对声誉造成损害。最重要的是，约翰·唐尼和理查德·费克图的传奇故事彰显了非凡的忠诚。这种忠诚不仅体现在这两名被剥夺了自由的人身上，而且还体现在中情局始终未放弃营救他们这一点上。虽然是由于行动部门的误判，使得这两人在中国监狱里度过了他们成人后的很大一部分时光，但中情局在此后对这两人的照顾，至少部分地补偿了它对此应负的责任。

 

2. The Operational Context

 

行动背景

 

John Downey and Richard Fecteau were youthful CIA paramilitary officers: Downey, born in Connecticut, had entered CIA in June 1951, after graduating from Yale; Fecteau, from Massachusetts, entered on duty a few months later, having graduated from Boston University. Both men had been varsity football players, and both were outgoing and engaging with noted senses of humor. They were on their first overseas assignment when the shootdown occurred.

 

约翰·唐尼和理查德·费克图是中情局内年轻的准军事人员：唐尼出生在康涅狄格州，1951年6月从耶鲁大学毕业后进入中央情报局。费克图比唐尼晚了几个月，从波士顿大学毕业后在马萨诸塞州加入中情局。这两人在大学里都是橄榄球运动员，性格外向，幽默感极强。他们是在海外执行第一项任务时被击落的。4

 

By late 1952, the Korean War had been going on for more than two years. Accounts often identify that war as the reason for the operation Downey and Fecteau were participating in. While largely true, the flight the men were on was part of operations that had antecedents in the US response to the communist takeover of China in 1949. In accordance with US policies, CIA took steps to exploit the potential for a Chinese “Third Force” by trying to link Chinese agents, trained by CIA, with alleged dissident generals on the mainland. This Third Force, while anticommunist, would be separate from the Nationalists, who were assessed to be largely discredited on the mainland.[2]

 

到1952年年底，朝鲜战争已经持续了两年多。在有关唐尼和费克图的报道中，经常将这场战争说成是他们那次任务背后的原因。虽然这种说法大致也算正确，但他们那次的飞行任务，其实是早在1949年红色政权夺取中国后，美国所做出的反应的一个组成部分。按照美国政府的政策，中情局采取措施，试图利用经其训练过的中国特工，与大陆上某些心怀不满的将军们联手，在中国发展起“第三势力”。这第三势力虽然反共，但与国民党无关，因为在大陆国民党很大程度上已被认为是名声扫地了。[2]

 

This Third Force project received new emphasis after the Communist Chinese intervened in the Korean War. At that point, the project aimed to divert Chinese resources from the war in Korea by promoting domestic antigovernment guerrilla operations. This was to be accomplished by small teams of Chinese agents, generally inserted through airdrops, who were to link up with local guerrilla forces, collect intelligence and possibly engage in sabotage and psychological warfare, and report back by radio.[3] The operational model was the OSS experience in Europe during World War II, which assumed a cooperative captive population—a situation, as it turned out, that did not prevail in China.

 

在新中国入朝参战后，这个“第三势力”的项目得到了新的重视。在当时，该项目旨在通过煽动中国国内的反政府游击战，分散大陆对朝鲜战争所投入的资源。其手段一般是借助中国籍特工组成的小分队，通过空投进入中国，与当地游击队取得联系，收集情报，还可能会搞些破坏和心理战，并通过无线电台向总部报告。[3]这种行动模式基于战略情报局（OSS）在第二次世界大战期间在欧洲的经验。它的一个前提条件是沦陷区人民愿意配合行动。而事实证明，在中国这种情况并不普遍。

 

By the time of Downey and Fecteau’s involvement in the Third Force program, its record was short and inauspicious. Because of resource constraints, the training of Chinese agents at CIA facilities in Asia was delayed, and the first Third Force team to be airdropped did not deploy until April 1952. This fourman team parachuted into southern China and was never heard from again.

 

在唐尼和费克图参与“第三势力”项目的时候，它所取得的成果寥寥无几，但又命运多舛。由于资源有限，在中情局亚洲基地对中国特工进行训练的行动被推迟，第一批“第三势力”的小分队直到1952年4月才被空投进中国。这支由四人组成的小分队空降到中国南部，从此杳无音信。1

 

The second Third Force team comprised five ethnic Chinese dropped into the Jilin region of Manchuria in midJuly 1952. Downey was well known to the Chinese operatives on this team because he had trained them. The team quickly established radio contact with Downey’s CIA unit outside of China and was resupplied by air in August and October. A sixth team member, intended as a courier between the team and the controlling CIA unit, was dropped in September. In early November, the team reported contact with a local dissident leader and said it had obtained needed operational documents such as official credentials. They requested airexfiltration of the courier, a method he had trained for but that the CIA had never attempted operationally.

 

第二支“第三势力”小分队由五名中国人组成，于1952年七月中旬被空投进东北的吉林地区。由于唐尼亲自训练了这些特工，因此他们对他很熟悉。这支小分队很快与位于中国境外唐尼所在的中情局单位建立起无线电联系，并且在8月和10月接受了空投的补给。第六名队员在9月被空投进中国，作为小分队和中情局上级指挥单位之间的通信员。11月初小分队报告说，他们与当地持不同政见的领导人取得了联系，并表示已得到了所需的行动文件，比如官方的证件等。他们要求将通信员用飞机接运出境。他接受过被飞机接走的训练，但中央情报局尚未在实际行动中使用过这种方法。

 

At that time, the technique for aerial pickup involved flying an aircraft at low altitude and hooking a line elevated between two poles. The line was connected to a harness in which the agent was strapped. Once airborne, the man was to be winched into the aircraft. This technique required specialized training, both for the pilots of the aircraft, provided by the CIA’s proprietary Civil Air Transport (CAT), and for the two men who would operate the winch. Pilots Norman Schwartz and Robert Snoddy had trained in the aerial pickup technique during the fall of 1952 and were willing to undertake the mission. On 20 November, Downey’s CIA unit radioed back to the team: “Will air snatch approximately 2400 hours” on 29 November.[4]

 

 

 

 

当时，空中接人的做法是飞机做低空飞行，然后用钩子勾住横挂在两根柱子之间的一条线。那条线连到固定住特工的安全带上。一旦他被带到空中，飞机上的绞盘就会把他收进机舱。无论是飞机的飞行员（由中央情报局下属的民用航空运输公司（CAT）提供），还是两名操纵绞盘的人，都需要针对这种技术进行专门的培训。飞行员诺曼·施瓦茨（Norman Schwartz）和罗伯特·斯诺迪（Robert Snoddy）曾在1952年秋天接受过空中接人技术培训，并愿意执行这项任务。11月20日，唐尼所在的中情局单位通过无线电回复小分队：将于11月29日“约24时进行空中接人”[4]。3

 

The question of who would operate the winch, however, was still unresolved. Originally, Chinese crewmen were to be used, but Downey’s unit chief decided that time was too short to fully train them. Instead, two CAT personnel trained in the procedure were identified for the pickup flight, but the CIA unit chief pulled them four days before the mission because they lacked the requisite clearances. Downey, who had been at the unit for about a year, and Fecteau, who had arrived in the first week of November, were directed to fill the breach. They were hurriedly trained in the procedure during the week of 24 November.

 

但谁来操纵绞盘的问题还没有解决。最初打算使用中国籍的人员，但唐尼所在单位的领导认为时间太短，来不及充分培训他们。取而代之的是两名接受过此项培训的CAT人员。但那位领导在行动开始4天前决定弃用这两人，因为他们没有参予秘密行动的足够资格。结果唐尼（他加入这个单位已大约1年）和费克图（他在11月的第一个星期刚刚加入）被命令来填补这个空缺。在11月24日开始的那一周时间里，他们匆匆进行了有关的训练。4

 

Late on 29 November, Downey and Fecteau boarded Schwartz and Snoddy’s olive drab C47 on an airfield on the Korean peninsula and took off for the rendezvous point in Chinese Communist Manchuria, some 400 miles away. It was a quiet, uneventful flight of less than three hours. The moon was nearly full and visibility was excellent. At one point, Fecteau opened a survival kit and noted that the .32caliber pistol therein had no ammunition—joking about that was the only conversation the men had on the flight.

 

11月29日晚，唐尼和费克图登上了由施瓦茨和斯诺迪驾驶的褐绿色C47飞机，从朝鲜半岛的某个机场起飞，前往约400英里外位于中共东北境内的接头地点。这段不到三个小时的航程一路平安无事。天上挂着将近满月的月亮，能见度良好。飞行中费克图打开了一个救生包，发现其中的.32口径手枪没有任何子弹。于是一路上他们就一直在拿这事开着玩笑。

 

Mission Gone Awry

 

任务出现意外2

 

The C47, with its CAT pilots and CIA crew, was heading for a trap. The agent team, unbeknownst to the men on the flight, had been captured by Communist Chinese security forces and had been turned.[5] The request for exfiltration was a ruse, and the promised documentation and purported contact with a local dissident leader were merely bait. The team members almost certainly had told Chinese authorities everything they knew about the operation and about the CIA men and facilities associated with it. From the way the ambush was conducted, it was clear that the Chinese Communists knew exactly what to expect when the C47 arrived at the pickup point.[6]

 

这架C47飞机，连同来自CAT的飞行员和来自中情局的机组人员，其实正在飞进一个陷阱。他们并不知道，那支小分队要已被中共的安全部队抓获，并已被策反。[5]要求空中接人只不过是一个诡计，所谓的文件和与当地反对派领导人的联络都是诱饵。小分队的队员们几乎肯定已向中国当局做了坦白，交代出他们所知道的关于这次行动及中情局有关人员和设施的一切内容。从伏击的方式判断，很显然中共十分清楚当C47飞机抵达接人地点时，到底会发生什么事情。[6]2

 

Reaching the designated area around midnight, the aircraft received the proper recognition signal from the ground.[7] Downey and Fecteau pushed out supplies for the agent team—food and equipment needed for the aerial pickup. Then Schwartz and Snoddy flew the aircraft away from the area to allow the team time to set up the poles and line for the “snatch.” Returning about 45 minutes later and receiving a ready signal, the C47 flew a dry run by the pickup point, which served both to orient the pilots and to alert the man being exfiltrated that the next pass would be for him. Copilot Snoddy came back momentarily to the rear of the aircraft to make sure Downey and Fecteau were ready. On the moonlit landscape, four or five people could be seen on the ground. One man was in the pickup harness, facing the path of the aircraft.

 

飞机在午夜前后到达指定区域，看到地面上出现了正确的识别信号。[7]唐尼和费克图推出了给小分队的给养和物资，包括食品和空中接人所需的设备。然后，施瓦茨和斯诺迪驾驶飞机离开那里，让小分队有时间架设起接人用的柱子和绳索。约45分钟后，飞机折返回来，看到了一切就绪的信号。C47先在接人地点预演了一次，这既有助于飞行员进行定位，同时也提醒那名被接的人员，下一次就轮到他了。副驾驶斯诺迪来到飞机的后部很快看了一下，以确保唐尼和费克图准备好了。在月光映照下，可以看到地面上有四，五个人。有一名男子身上系好了安全带，面对着飞机飞来的方向。

 

As the C47 came in low for the pickup, flying nearly at its stall speed of around 60 knots, white sheets that had been camouflaging two antiaircraft guns on the snowy terrain flew off and gunfire erupted at the very moment the pickup was to have been made. The guns, straddling the flight path, began a murderous crossfire. At this point, a crowd of men emerged from the woods.[8] Whether by reflex or purposefully, the pilots directed the aircraft’s nose up, preventing an immediate crash; however, the engines cut out and the aircraft glided to a controlled crash among some trees, breaking in two with the nose in the air.

 

当C47以接近失速的大约60节的速度做超低空飞行来接人时，雪原上覆盖住两门高射炮的白色伪装布被掀了起来。就在飞机本应该接到人的那一刻，高射炮开火了。这两门炮横在飞行线路上，组成了凶猛的交叉火力。此时，从树林里冲出一群人来。[8]不知是条件反射还是有意如此，飞行员拉起了飞机的机头，避免了当场坠毁。但是，发动机已经失灵，飞机滑行了一段距离，坠毁到树丛中。机身断为两截，机头朝天。

 

Downey and Fecteau had been secured to the aircraft with harnesses to keep them from falling out during the winching. On impact, both slid along the floor of the aircraft, cushioned somewhat by their heavy winter clothing. Fecteau’s harness broke, causing him to crash into the bulkhead separating the main body of the aircraft from the cockpit, which, he later said, gave him a bump on his head “you could hang your coat on.”

 

在此之前，为了防止操纵绞盘时摔出飞机，唐尼和费克图已系好安全带固定在飞机上了。飞机坠落时，他俩沿着机舱地板滚了起来，身上厚重的冬衣起到了一定的缓冲作用。费克图的安全带断了，使他撞到了驾驶舱和机舱之间的隔板上。他后来说，这一下给他头上撞起一个大包，大到“你都可以把大衣挂到它上面了。”

 

Other than suffering bruises and being shaken up, Downey and Fecteau were extremely fortunate in being unhurt. The Chinese apparently had targeted the cockpit, with gunfire passing through the floor in the forward part of the aircraft but stopping short of where Downey and Fecteau had been stationed, although one bullet singed Downey’s cheek. Meanwhile, tracer bullets had ignited the fuel. Both men tried to get to the cockpit to check on the pilots, who were not answering Downey’s shouts, but their part of the aircraft was burning fiercely and the two had to move away. Whether due to gunfire, the impact, or the fire, the pilots died at the scene.[9] Fecteau later remembered standing outside the aircraft with Downey, both stunned but conscious, telling each other that they were “in a hell of a mess.” The Chinese security forces descended on them, “whooping and hollering,” and they gave themselves up to the inevitable.

 

除了受到些擦伤和震荡，唐尼和费克图非常幸运地没受其它伤。中国人显然是瞄准驾驶舱开的火，炮火穿透了飞机前部的地板，但没有打到唐尼和费克图所在的位置。只有一颗子弹擦着唐尼的脸颊飞过。与此同时，曳光弹把燃料点着了。这两人都试图去查看驾驶舱里的飞行员。他们没有回答唐尼的呼叫。他们所在的那部份飞机烧起了大火。这两人不得不撤开。不管是由于炮火还是撞击或大火，总之两名飞行员当场死亡。[9]费克图后来回忆起与唐尼一起站在飞机旁边的情形：当时两人都非常震惊，但神智很清醒。他们互相告诉对方：这回他们“麻烦大了”。中国的安全部队“连呼带叫”地冲了过来，他们俩人放弃了抵抗，束手就擒。3

 

Assessing Field Responsibility

 

评估外勤部门的责任

 

Over the years, various explanations arose within CIA to explain Downey and Fecteau’s participation in the illfated mission. It seemed incredible to operations officers that two CIA employees, familiar with operations, locations, and personnel, would be sent on a mission that exposed them to possible capture by the Chinese Communists. One of the most persistent myths was that the two must have been joyriding because their participation was, it was thought, a violation of the rules. In fact, the record shows that they were directed to be on the flight and that they had received specialized training in preparation for it. It may have been poor judgment on the part of Downey and Fecteau’s boss, the CIA unit chief—who in fixing a tactical problem (the lack of security clearances by aircraft personnel) created a strategic vulnerability—and certainly it appears so in hindsight. In any case, it was only after the shootdown that the rules were changed so that no CIA officer would fly over the Chinese mainland.[10]

 

多年以来，中情局内部出现了各种说法，解释唐尼和费克图为何会参予这项夭折的行动。派两名熟悉任务、地点、人员的中情局人员参加这项有可能被中共俘虏的行动，这有些让人难以置信。流传最久的一种说法是，这两个人肯定是打算去兜兜风，因为他们的参与在有些人看来，属于违反规定的行为。事实上，记录表明他们是接到命令参加此次飞行的，并且为此专门接受了培训。这可能在一定程度上归咎于唐尼和费克图的上级、即他们在中情局的单位领导判断失误：他避免了一个战术问题（机组人员缺乏安全资格），却制造出一个战略弱点。——在事后看来的确如此。无论如何，在飞机出事之后有关规定被进行了修改，不再容许中央情报局人员飞入中国大陆领空。[10]

 

In addition to the field shortcomings in assigning Downey and Fecteau to the fatal mission, there is the question of whether the field ignored warnings that the deployed team had been turned by the communists. Such is the claim of a former senior operations officer who, as a young man, had served in Downey and Fecteau’s unit in 1952. This officer asserts that, in the summer before the November flight, an analysis of two messages sent by the team made it “90 percent” certain, in his view, that the team had been doubled. Bringing his concerns to the attention of the unit chief, the officer was rebuffed for lack of further evidence. When he persisted, he was transferred to another CIA unit. After Downey and Fecteau’s flight failed to return, the unit chief called the officer back and told him not to talk about the matter, and he followed instructions—much to his later regret.

 

一名外勤部门的前高级官员曾宣称，该部门除了在安排唐尼和费克图参加这次致命任务的方面有所失误之外，还有可能事先忽视了小分队已经被共产党策反的征兆。在1952年，此人（当时还是年轻人）曾和唐尼与费克图在同一个单位供职。据他表示，在11月那次飞行之前的夏季，通过分析小分队传回的两条消息，他认为有“百分之九十”的可能，该小分队已经变节。他向单位领导反映了自己的担心，但领导反驳说他缺乏进一步的证据。他坚持自己的观点，结果被调到了中央情报局的另一个部门。在唐尼和费克图的飞机没能返回之后，那名单位领导把这位军官召回，并告诉他不要谈论此事。他遵令而行，但后来十分后悔。

 

No record of an inquiry into the decision to send Downey and Fecteau on the flight appears to exist. It is clear that no one was ever disciplined for it, probably because it was a wartime decision in the field. Moreover, it could be argued that the success of the August and October missions to resupply the team indicated that the team had not been doubled. Many years later, Downey told a debriefer that he felt no bitterness toward the man who sent him on the mission: “I felt for him. It turned out to be such a goddamned disaster from his point of view.”

 

没有记录显示，中情局曾对派遣唐尼和费克图上飞机这个决定进行过调查。很显然，也没有人因此得到过纪律处分。这可能是因为它仅仅是战争时期在外勤地的一个决定而已。此外，8月和10月对小分队的成功补给，也可以说明他们并未被策反。多年以后，唐尼向听取他汇报的人员表示，他对派遣他参加此项任务的人并没有心存怨怼：“我能理解他。从他的角度来看，这变成了一件非常倒霉的事情。”

 

Men without a Future

 

没有前途的人

 

The Chinese security forces treated Downey and Fecteau roughly as they tied them up. The prisoners were taken to a building in a nearby village—possibly a police station in Antu, which was near the pickup point. There it became clear that the agent team had talked: Across the room, Downey saw the courier they were to pick up looking at him and nodding to a Chinese security officer, a man of some authority with his leather jacket and pistol, who pointed at Downey and said, in English, “You are Jack.” Fecteau remembers being told, “Your future is very dark.” The man took their names. Fecteau gave his full name, Richard George Fecteau, to warn off potential rescuers if the Chinese sent out a false message from him and Downey. The two CIA officers, with a dozen armed guards, were then taken by truck and train to a prison in Mukden (Shenyang), the largest city in Manchuria, almost 300 miles away. In Mukden, they were shackled with heavy leg irons and isolated in separate cells.

 

中国的安全部队很粗暴地将唐尼和费克图绑了起来。他们被带到附近一个村庄的建筑物里，可能是靠近接头地点的安图警察局。在那里，他们清楚地意识到小分队已经变节了：唐尼看到那名他们本该接走的通信员，在房间的另一侧看着他，并对一名穿着皮夹克、挎着手枪的中国军官点着头。那人用英语对唐尼说：“你是杰克。”费克图则记得有人对他说：“你的前途一片漆黑。”那人记下他们的名字。费克图给出了自己的全名：理查德·乔治·费克图。一旦中国人以他和唐尼的名义发出虚假的信息，这可以给潜在的救援人员发出警告。随后，这两名中情局人员被十几名武装警卫坐卡车和火车押送到奉天（沈阳）监狱。沈阳是将近300英里以外的东北最大城市。在那里，他们被戴上沉重的脚镣，分别被关在单独的牢房里。

 

 

Reaction at Home

 

总部的反应

 

Several hours after the scheduled time of pickup, the CIA field unit received a message from the agent team, reporting that the snatch had been successful. However, when the C47 was overdue for its return on the morning of 30 November 1952, CIA worked with Civil Air Transport to concoct a cover story—a CAT aircraft on a commercial flight from Korea to Japan on 3 December was missing and, as of 4 December, was presumed lost in the Sea of Japan. Downey and Fecteau were identified as Department of the Army civilian employees. Meanwhile, the US military conducted an intensive search of accessible sea and land routes, with negative results. Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Walter Bedell Smith signed letters of condolence to the men’s families, saying “I have learned that [your son/your husband] was a passenger on a commercial plane flight between South Korea and Japan which is now overdue and that there is grave fear that he may have been lost.”

 

在预定接人时间过去了几个小时之后，中情局的外勤部门收到了小分队发回的消息，报告说接人行动已取得成功。然而，由于C47飞机没有能按时在1952年11月30日上午返回，中情局与CAT合作编造了一段谎言，称：一架CAT的飞机在12月3日执行从韩国到日本的商业航班时失踪，并已被认定于12月4日在日本海失事。唐尼和费克图被说成是陆军部的文职雇员。与此同时，美国军方在海上和陆路进行了密集搜索，结果一无所获。中央情报局局长（DCI）沃尔特·比德尔·史密斯（Walter Bedell Smith）签署了慰问信发给这两位的家人，信中说：“我获悉[您的儿子/丈夫]乘坐了一架在韩国和日本之间进行商业飞行的飞机。现在该架飞机逾期未归，极恐可能已经失事。”

 

By mid-December, CIA had made the official determination that the men were missing in action; however, within the Agency’s Far East Division, the strong feeling was that Downey and Fecteau, as well as the pilots, were dead at the scene of the intended pickup. With nothing other than the conviction that the Chinese Communists would have made propaganda use of the CIA men had either remained alive, the Agency declared Downey and Fecteau “presumed dead” on 4 December 1953. Letters to that effect were sent to the families under the signature of DCI Allen Dulles.[11]

 

到12月中旬，中情局正式确定这两人属于失踪人员。但是，中情局远东司更倾向于认定唐尼、费克图以及飞行员们，都在接人地点当场死亡。他们认为，如果这两名中情局人员哪怕有一位还活着，中共肯定会已经拿出来宣传。仅仅基于这样的信念，中情局于1953年12月4日宣布唐尼和费克图“推定死亡”。宣布这一结论的信函经中情局局长艾伦·杜勒斯（Allen Dulles）签字后，寄给了这两人的家人。[11]

 

The Interrogations

 

审讯

 

Meanwhile, of course, the men were very much alive, a fact known only to their captors. Separated in Mukden, Downey and Fecteau would not see each other for two years. The interrogations began, with sessions usually lasting for four hours, but some as long as 24 hours straight. Sleep deprivation was part of the game: The men were prohibited from sleeping during the day and the Chinese would invariably haul them off for middleofthenight interrogations after a half hour’s sleep. An important element of the Chinese technique was to tell Downey and Fecteau that no one knew they were alive and that no one would ever know until the Chinese decided to announce the fact—if they ever decided to do so. At the same time, the men were told that the US government was evil and did not care about them and that they should forget their families. Downey later said, “I was extremely scared…. We were isolated and had no idea of what was going to happen to us and had no idea of what was going on in the world.”

 

当然，与此同时这两人仍然健在，不过只有俘虏了他们的人才知道这个事实。自从在沈阳被分开之后，唐尼和费克图要等到两年之后才会再次见到对方。审讯开始了。通常每次会持续4个小时，但有时甚至长达连续24个小时。剥夺睡眠的事情司空见惯：白天他们不容许睡觉，而晚上刚刚睡半个小时之后，中国人总是会把他们拉起来，半夜进行审讯。中国人审讯技巧的一个重要内容是告诉唐尼和费克图，没有人知道他们还活着；而且在中国决定宣布这个事实之前（宣布与否并不确定），永远也不会有人会知道。同时他们被告知，美国政府十分邪恶，不关心他们。他们应该忘记自己的家人。唐尼后来说，“我当时非常害怕...。我们被孤立起来，不清楚自己将会如何，也不清楚外部世界上在发生什么事。”

 

During the first two years of their captivity, while no one outside of China knew their fate, the men were subjected to enormous pressure to confess that they were CIA spies, repent of their “crimes,” and tell everything they knew about CIA personnel, operations, and locations. The deck was stacked because the Chinese authorities already knew much from this Third Force agent team and from others they had caught. Downey and Fecteau’s training had covered subjects like “Resistance” and “Police Methods,” but it was inadequate for this dilemma. Fecteau, in fact, lamented the lack of relevant training: “We had none, and it really hurt me. I had to play it by ear as I went along, and I was never sure whether I was right or wrong.” He even remembered being told in training that, “if you are captured by the communists, you might as well tell them what you know because they are going to get it from you anyway.” Downey, similarly, had been told by an instructor, “If you are captured, you’ll talk.” It certainly did not help that the men knew so much—Downey was intimately familiar with Third Force operations from his experience over the previous year; Fecteau had been in the field for only three weeks but had carried out his supervisor’s order to familiarize himself with the program by reading the operational files for two or three hours every day.

 

在被俘后的最初两年里，除了中国之外没有别人知道他俩的命运。这两人承受了巨大的压力，被逼坦白他们是中央情报局的间谍，并且对他们的“罪行”表示悔过，还要交代他们知道的，有关中央情报局人员、运作和地点的一切信息。中国当局胸有成竹，因为他们已经从小分队和其它俘虏那里知道了第三势力的情况。唐尼和费克图受到过的培训，涉及了“抗拒”和“警察手段”等科目，但远不够应付这样的难题。实际上，费克图曾经哀叹过缺乏相关的培训：“我们一点（培训）都没有，这真的让我很苦恼。我只能根据情况随机应变。但我一直不知道我做的是对还是错。”他甚至记得，当初在训练时曾被告知：“如果你被共产党人捕获，你不妨告诉他们自己所知道一切，因为他们早晚都会从你身上榨出来。”同样，唐尼的教官也曾告诉他：“如果你被捉住就招供。”这两人知道如此多的内情，显然对他们没有什么好处。唐尼有着过去一年的经验，深知第三势力的活动情况; 费克图虽然加入进来只有3个星期，但他按照上司的命令，曾每天阅读两三个小时的业务文件来熟悉这个项目的情况。

 

Both men initially tried to stick to their cover story. Unfortunately, both were told before the flight to say they were CAT employees, which was at variance with the official cover story that they were US Army civilians on a commercial flight. Their Chinese interrogators caught them out and made subsequent interrogations more intensive and confrontational.

 

两人起初试图坚持自己事先编好的故事。不幸的是，他俩在飞行前都被告知，说他们要自称是CAT的雇员。而这与官方声称的他们是进行商业飞行的美国陆军文职人员的说法不符。中国的审讯员揭穿了他们的瞎话，随后的审讯变得更猛烈和更具对抗性。1

 

The men were never tortured physically or, after their initial capture, beaten.[12] Fecteau reported that he wore leg irons constantly for the first 10 months and that he was made to stand during interrogations to the point of falling down from exhaustion, especially after being caught lying or bluffing. Downey remembered the leg irons and the intense psychological pressure of interrogations, plus the added mental stress from concocting new stories after the cover story evaporated—as he later acknowledged, telling lies requires an extraordinarily good memory.

 

 

 

 

这两人从来没有受到过肉体折磨。而且，除了他们最初被捕获时以外，也从未被殴打过。[12]费克图报告说前10个月里，他经常戴着脚镣。他被强制站在那里接受审讯，尤其是被识破了在撒谎或虚张声势之后，更是如此。有时他会站到因精疲力尽而摔倒。唐尼也记得脚镣，还有审讯所带来的强烈心理压力，以及在编造的故事被揭穿后，炮制新故事所导致的精神紧张。正如他后来所承认的那样，说假话需要超强的记忆力。

 

Eventually both men—isolated from each other, battered psychologically, threatened with torture and execution—talked, albeit divulging varying degrees of truth. Downey, hemmed in by the disclosures of the team he had trained, confessed his CIA affiliation on the 16th day. He later recalled that telling what he knew was liberating: “I’m free and they have got to leave me in peace, and thus relieve the psychological strain of resisting…. [They] can’t come at me anymore mentally because it is all out there.”

 

由于两人无法彼此联系，从心理上被反复摧残，并受到酷刑和处决的威胁，最后他们都做了交代，但两人交代的程度有所不同。唐尼面对经他所训练的小分队的证词，到第16天不得不承认了自己属于中央情报局人员。他后来回忆说，坦白交代之后他有种解脱的感觉：“我不再有负担，他们也该让我清静一下了，这消除了因抗拒而带来的心理压力...。[他们]在精神上不能再对我施加压力，因为我知道的都说了。”

 

Fecteau, who was unknown to the captured Chinese assets, had an easier situation to manage:

 

由于被中国所抓住的那个小分队队员不认识费克图，因此他的日子相对好过一些：

 

The story I decided to stick to, I decided to keep it as simple as possible, was to tell them only what I needed to know to be where I was. I decided to add nothing else. I decided to shorten my length of service with the Agency from November 1951 [and] changed that to June 1952, to give me only five months in the Agency [to] make it much easier to explain to the interrogators. I thus cut out a lot of the training I had taken, cut down on the number of names they would ask of people I had met within the Agency and so forth. I based it all on “need to know,” only what I needed to know to be where I was.

 

我决定编一个尽可能简单的故事，然后一口咬定不再更改。这就是说，只告诉他们我参与这项任务所需要知道的最少事实。除此之外，我决定绝不多说一个字。我决定把自己加入中情局的日期从

1951年11月改为1952年6月，使我在中情局的服务期缩短为5个月，这样一来向审讯员解释起来更省事。因此，我略去了我所接受的很多训练，也减少了他们盘问我所接触的中情局人员姓名的数量等等。我的原则是，我只知道为执行任务所必须需要知道的内容。

 

They kept asking for names, names, names. I decided that all Agency names except classmates [from training], I would tell them only first names and I stuck with that all the way, instructors, people in Washington, all first names only. As to personnel [in the field], I told them that I had only been there three weeks and I only knew first names there also…. On the names of classmates I knew they would ask not only the names but character descriptions, physical descriptions. I then decided to give the names of my fellow teammates on the Boston University football team [to] be able to give them very good character descriptions.

 

他们不停地让我交代名字，名字，名字。我决定，除了训练班里同学的名字之外，对于其他中情局人员，我只告诉中国人他们的名而不提他们的姓。我自始至终一直坚持这种方式，无论是培训的教官，还是华盛顿的人，我都只说名不说姓。对于在外勤地的那些人，我告诉中国人，我刚到那里三个星期，只知道那些人的名，不知道姓

...。至于同学的姓名，我知道他们会不只盘问姓名，也会让我描述那些人的性格和相貌。于是我决定用我在波士顿大学橄榄球队队友的姓名来代替，这样我能够很好地描述他们的性格。

 

Fecteau made his “cover confession” on the 13th day, after thinking it through the previous night. This technique of Fecteau’s— which Downey almost certainly could not have employed without tripping up against what the Chinese already knew—enabled Fecteau to withhold information safely for his entire imprisonment, and it turned out to be a huge morale boost: “The thing that sustained me most through the 19 years was the fact that I didn’t tell them everything I had known. Whenever I felt depressed, this was the greatest help to me.” Even so, both men, but especially Downey, were plagued by feelings of guilt for the information they had given up.[13]

 

费克图在被捕13天之后，交代了他前一天晚上构思出来的“坦白”。费克图的这种策略，唐尼几乎肯定无法效仿，因为那会与中国已经知道的内容有所冲突。费克图依靠它，在服刑期间保守住了信息的安全。他还发现，这样做可以极大地鼓舞士气：“支撑我熬过这19年的最重要信念就是，我没有告诉他们我所知道的一切。每当我感到沮丧时，这个信念都会帮我很多忙。”即便如此，这两个人都为自己所做的交代产生了负罪感。唐尼尤其如此。[13]

 

After their first five months in Mukden, the men were moved to a prison in Beijing. They were still isolated and in irons, still undergoing interrogations, still each in a small cell illuminated by a single bulb, with a straw mattress. Fecteau remembers being told to sit on the floor and stare at a black dot on the wall and think about his crimes. For five months after the move to Beijing, he was not allowed a bath. His weight dropped by 70 pounds; Downey lost 30 pounds.[14]

 

他们前五个月被关在沈阳，然后被转移到位于北京的监狱里。他们仍然分开被关押，并且还戴着脚链，仍在被不断审问。每间小小的牢房里都只有一个照明用的灯泡，还有一张稻草床垫。费克图记得自己被吩咐坐在地板上，凝视着墙上的黑点，并思考他的罪行。从他搬到北京后，足足有五个月，他没能洗上一次澡。他的体重下降了70磅;唐尼则减了30磅。[14]

 

Back From the Dead

 

死而复生

 

Two years after their capture, the men saw each other for the first time since the shootdown. They were put on trial together in a secret military proceeding, the authorities apparently having been satisfied with the take from the interrogations. Fecteau remembers being marched into the courtroom and told to stand by Downey, who looked despondent and who was dressed in a new prison suit. To cheer Downey as he stood next to him, Fecteau whispered, “Who’s your tailor?” Downey smiled thinly. Such humor in the face of adversity was needed, for the military tribunal convicted Downey, the “Chief Culprit,” and Fecteau, the “Assistant Chief Culprit,” of espionage. Downey received life imprisonment; Fecteau, 20 years. Downey’s immediate reaction was relief, as he had assumed he would be executed. Fecteau could not imagine even 10 years in prison, but he felt sorrier for Downey than for himself. When Fecteau remarked, “My wife is going to die childless,” Downey broke into laughter, angering the guards.

 

被捕两年之后，他俩才再一次见面。当时他们被同时送上一个秘密的军事审判庭，显然当局对从审讯中得到的信息已经感到满意。费克图记得走进法庭后，被告知站在唐尼身边。后者穿着一套新的囚服，看上去有些沮丧。为了让唐尼高兴起来，费克图站在他身旁时低声说：“谁给你裁的衣服啊？”唐尼微微笑了起来。在面对逆境时，这种幽默是必要的。军事法庭最终裁定唐尼为从事间谍活动的“首犯”，而费克图为“从犯”。唐尼被判无期徒刑; 费克图被判20年徒刑。唐尼的最初反应是解脱，因为他曾以为自己会被处决。费克图觉得即使10年的监禁都已经长得无法想象，但他更为唐尼感到难过。费克图说了句：“我老婆看起来要到死也没有小孩了。”唐尼忍不住笑出了声，惹恼了警卫。

 

That day, 23 November 1954, almost a year after the CIA had pronounced Downey and Fecteau “presumed dead,” Beijing declared them alive, in custody, and serving their sentences as convicted CIA spies. The first that the Agency learned of it was through a New China News Agency broadcast. At the same time, the Chinese announced the sentencing, also for espionage, of the officers and crew of a US Air Force B29 aircraft, shot down over China some weeks after Downey and Fecteau’s C47 flight.

 

这一天是1954年11月23日，离中情局宣布唐尼和费克图“推定死亡”已经过去了几乎整整一年。当天，北京方面宣布他俩还活着，被关押在狱中，作为中情局间谍在服刑。中情局最初是通过一条中新社的广播知道此事的。与此同时，中国也宣布了对美国空军一架B29飞机上的机组人员的判决。他们是在唐尼和费克图的C47之后几个星期在中国被击落的，同样被定为间谍罪。

 

Trying to Secure Release

 

努力营救

 

The Agency quickly assembled an ad hoc committee under Richard M. Bissell Jr., then a special assistant to the DCI. Bissell’s committee accepted the Chinese declaration as true and changed the men’s status from “presumed dead” to “missing in action.” Further, the committee decided to backstop the cover story that Downey and Fecteau were Army civilians traveling as passengers on a contract aircraft between Korea and Japan; this required coordination with the Pentagon and dealing with some two dozen persons outside the government who were aware of the CIA affiliation of either Downey or Fecteau: family members, officials of three insurance companies, two banks, several lawyers, and the executor of an estate. Despite the potential for leaks, the true status of the two men was kept secret by authoritative sources for many years, and there was no deviation from the cover story for two decades.

 

中情局迅速成立了一个由小理查德·M·比塞尔（Richard M. Bissell Jr.）牵头的特别委员会。比塞尔当时是中情局局长的特别助理。这个委员会认为中国宣布的消息是真实的，因此把这两个人的状态从“推定死亡”改变为“失踪”。此外，委员会还决定继续坚持当初编造出来的故事，即唐尼和费克图是美国陆军文职人员，作为乘客乘坐包机往返于韩国和日本之间。这要求与五角大楼进行必要的协调，并与政府以外知道这两个人属于中情局的二十多个人打好招呼。这些人包括他们的家庭成员，三家保险公司和两家银行里的人员，几名律师以及遗瞩执行人。尽管冒着被泄漏的危险，当局对两人的真正身份保密多年，在20年里一直没有改口。

 

Contrary to the public histories that claim the CIA “abandoned” the men during their captivity, the Agency continually argued for official US efforts to induce the Chinese to free them and monitored such efforts on the part of the State Department and other agencies.[15] As soon as it was known that the men were alive in late 1954, Bissell proposed that the US government put pressure—diplomatic and covert—on Beijing to free the men. Bissell was authorized to convene a working group to study the problem, but his proposal went nowhere. Other US agencies were against forceful action against China; at least one based its opposition on the assessment that Beijing had a good case in international law against Downey and Fecteau.[16]

 

在公开的历史中，有人说中情局在这两人被囚禁期间“抛弃”了他们。但恰恰相反，中情局一直力主美国官方不断努力，促使中国释放他俩，并关注着国务院和其他机构在这方面的努力。[15 ]1954年底，一旦得知这两人还活着之后，比塞尔随即建议美国政府通过外交渠道秘密施压，力争北京放人。比塞尔被授权召集起一个工作小组来研究这个问题，但他的建议没有取得什么进展。其他美国政府机构都反对对中国采取强有力的行动，其中一种反对的观点认为，按国际法，北京有权对唐尼和费克图进行审判。[16]

 

Throughout the years of the men’s imprisonment, senior CIA officers met periodically to discuss the case with counterparts at the State Department and the Pentagon. During discussions in 1955 of a general release of military prisoners associated with Korean War operations, the Agency was rebuffed within the US government in its attempts to include Downey and Fecteau in such a release, despite strong and highlevel CIA representations that the CIA prisoners should be treated in the same way as US military personnel shot down and captured by the Chinese.

 

在这两人的囚禁期间，中央情报局高级官员定期与国务院和五角大楼的同行会晤，讨论此案的情况。1955年，在关于释放与朝鲜战争有关的全体战俘问题所进行的一次讨论中，中情局试图把唐尼和费克图也包括在战俘中。但是，尽管中央情报局派出高层进行了强有力的阐述，说明这两名囚犯应该和其他被中国击落并俘虏的美国军人一样对待，这个提议还是在美国政府内部被否决了。

 

The rationale given for separating the two categories was that if the same line were adopted for military and civilian personnel, Beijing might then deny the prisoner of war status of the former, and all would remain in captivity. Thus, Washington took the case of its military personnel to the UN General Assembly but did not include Downey and Fecteau in its demand for release.

 

区分这两类人员的理由是，如果对军人和文职人员采用同样的处理方式，北京有可能会否认前者为战俘，他们会像文职人员一样继续被关押下去。因此，华盛顿把其军事人员的情况向联大做了提交，但在其要求释放的名单里不包括唐尼和费克图。

 

CIA was alone in the US government in pressing the issue. China released US military prisoners in 1955 but continued to maintain that Downey and Fecteau were on a mission unrelated to the Korean War. And, despite protests from CIA, official Washington kept up the fiction that they were Army civilians whose flight strayed into Chinese airspace. For the next 15 years, US diplomats would bring up the matter during talks with Chinese counterparts in Geneva and Warsaw, but US policy that there would be no bargaining, no concessions, and no recognition of the Communist Chinese government prevented movement.

 

在美国政府中，只有中情局在不断努力推动这个事情。中国在1955年释放了美军战俘，但继续声称唐尼和费克图所执行的任务与朝鲜战争无关。而且，尽管中情局有所抗议，华盛顿官方继续说着瞎话，称他们两人是军队文职人员，误入中国领空飞行。在接下来的15年里，美国外交官在日内瓦和华沙同中国同行进行会晤时，常常提到此事，但美国所采取的“不讨价还价，不妥协，不承认共产党中国政府”的政策，使得此事一直没有进展。

 

The Long Wait

 

漫长的等待

 

There may be some among us who can imagine 20 days in captivity; perhaps a fraction of those can imagine a full year deprived of liberty and most human contact. But 20 years? Downey and Fecteau have consistently sought to downplay their period of imprisonment; and neither has done what arguably too many former CIA officers do these days with far less justification: write a book. Downey has said that such a book would contain “500 blank pages,” and Fecteau says the whole experience could be summed up by the word “boring.”[17]

 

我们之间可能有些人可以想像被囚禁20天会是什么样，也许很少一部分人可以想像一整年被剥夺自由，没有机会接触别人的滋味。但谁能想象20年如此是什么感受？唐尼和费克图一直试图淡化其监禁过程; 他俩谁也没有将这部分经历写成书出版——如今，可以说有太多的前中情局官员热衷于出书，虽然他们写书的理由远不如这两个人的充分。唐尼说，如果他写书，那么这本书里将包含“500页空白”。而费克图说，整个经历其实用一个词就可以概括：“无所事事”。[17]

 

No doubt boredom was among their greatest enemies, but of course the men are downplaying a significant ordeal. What we know is that living conditions in the first few years were harsh, improving after their trials to spartan. Their sparsely furnished, small cells were generally cold and drafty and allowed for little external stimuli—the windows were whitewashed and a dim light bulb burned constantly. Food was simple—almost exclusively rice, vegetables, and bread, with perhaps some meat on holidays. Both spent stretches in solitary confinement that went on for years—one span was six years. While the most intense questioning ended with their trial and sentencing in late 1954, both were subjected throughout to verbal insults and psychological abuse, particularly of a kind that Fecteau called “the whipsaw”: their captors would improve conditions—providing better food, access to books and magazines, or a luxury such as soap—only to take them away.

 

毫无疑问，无聊是他们最大的敌人之一。但显然这两个人也是在尽量淡化他们经历过的重大考验。据我们所知，在最初几年里，他们的生活条件恶劣。到审判之后，条件有所改善，但仍非常简陋。他们狭小的牢房里没有什么家具，凉风阵阵，通常总是很冷，很少能接触到外部刺激——窗户被刷上了白灰，牢房里总点着一只暗淡的灯泡。食物很简单，几乎完全是米饭，蔬菜，馒头，节假日里也许会有些肉。这两人都被单独囚禁了多年——有一回单独囚禁时间长达6年。虽然最激烈的审问在1954年底他们被审判和判刑后就结束了，但这两人自始至终受到言辞辱骂和精神虐待。费克图把中方的一种典型手段称为“拉锯式”：监禁他们的人先改善条件——提供更好的食品，提供书籍和杂志，或肥皂之类的奢侈品——然后又取消这一切。

 

Worst of all were the hints at early releases. In 1955, for example, Downey and Fecteau were placed together in a large cell housing the Air Force officers and crew of the downed B29. For three weeks, the group of Americans lived together, with little supervision and expanded privileges. The Chinese allowed the CIA men to believe they would be released with the Air Force group. Then, as Downey recalls, “the axe fell,” and he and Fecteau were suddenly removed into solitary confinement.

 

最糟糕的是暗示他们能够被提前释放。例如1955年，唐尼和费克图被安置进一个大的牢房里，与被击落的B29飞机上的空军军官和机组人员关押在一起。这群美国人在一起生活了3个星期，几乎没受什么监视，享有的权力也增加了一些。中方让中情局的这两人相信，他们将和空军那批人一起被释放。唐尼回忆说，随后“斧头砍了下来”，他和费克图突然又被押走，改成单独监禁。2

 

Both men learned that complaining was usually counterproductive. Once, when Fecteau said the tomatoes in his food gave him indigestion, all he saw for three weeks was tomatoes—green tomatoes. After that, whenever he was asked, “How is the food?” Fecteau would always respond with “adequate.”[18] If he complained that there was not enough water for his weekly bath, there would be less water next time. Likewise, the men learned not to request medical treatment until a condition was serious enough to draw attention to it.

 

这两人都发现，抱怨通常是适得其反。有一次，费克图说，食物里的西红柿让他得了消化不良。随后三个星期里，他顿顿都只能吃未熟的青西红柿。此后，每当有人问他：“食物怎么样？”费克图总是回答说：“还行。”[18]如果他抱怨说，在每周一次的洗澡时没有足够的水，那么下一次水会更少。同样的，这两人也学会了除非病情严重到明显需要治疗，否则不要去要求医疗服务。

 

Insights from Captivity

 

囚禁中得出的经验2

 

Even if Downey and Fecteau do not consider their long captivity suitable for literary treatment, there is great value for today’s intelligence officers in how they played the bad hand dealt to them. The men’s reflections on their imprisonment—generally made shortly after their release, when impressions were freshest—provide a series of “lessons learned” that could be relevant to others facing long captivity.

 

 

 

 

尽管唐尼和费克图认为他们被长期囚禁的经历不适合写成书，但他们面对困境时所采取的应对措施，对当今的情报人员还是有巨大价值的。在这两人被释放后不久，印象还很鲜明的时候，曾对被囚禁的经历做过一些反思，提供了一系列“经验教训”，对于面临长期囚禁的其他人来说，可能是很有用的。

 

Never Give Up Hope. Downey and Fecteau affirmed that they always believed that CIA and the US government were doing everything they could and that eventually they would be released. Both rejected Chinese assertions that they had been abandoned, that no one cared what happened to them. Fecteau, in fact, reasoned that he could never forget he was an American and an Agency man— his captors threw it in his face so often that he never lost his sense of identity and affiliation. Suicide was never contemplated by either man.

 

永不放弃希望

。唐尼和费克图始终坚信，中央情报局和美国政府正在尽一切可能营救他们，而他们最终会被释放。他们都拒绝接受中国人所说的他们已被抛弃，没有人再关心他们遭遇的说法。事实上，费克图甚至说他从来没有办法忘记他是一名美国人，一名中情局特工，因为关押他的那些人经常当面这样称他，以至于他从未失去他的身份和归属意识。这两人都从来没有考虑过自杀。

 

Scale Down Expectations. While never losing the strategic conviction that they would return home, the men learned to be wary, on a tactical level, of developments that were too good to be true. Between periods of solitary confinement, for example, they often had one or two Chinese cellmates. If either Downey or Fecteau appeared to be getting on well with a Chinese prisoner, the American might find himself suddenly in solitary for a year. After one such “whipsaw,” Fecteau was asked by a guard: “Are you lonely now?” So the men disciplined themselves to lower expectations, to the point that when Fecteau was taken to the Hong Kong border in December 1971, he made himself assume that the release he had been promised was another “whipsaw,” until he actually crossed the bridge. Likewise, when Downey was told in 1973 that he was being released, he responded with indifference, saying he wanted to finish the televised pingpong match he was watching. He recalls, “I had a tight rein on my expectations.”

 

降低期望值

。虽然从战略上他俩一直没有失去重返家园的信念，但在战术层面，他们学会了对过于美好以至于不太可能的事态发展保持谨慎态度。例如，在单独监禁一段期间后，他们往往会被与一个或两个中国同牢犯人关在一起。如果唐尼或费克图与中国籍囚犯相处得越来越好，那么他们可能会发现自己突然又会被单独监禁一年。有一次在经过这样“拉锯”之后，一名看守问费克图：“你现在寂寞吗？”因此，这两人强制自己降低期望。当费克图在1971年12月被带到中港边境时，直到他实际上过桥进入了香港之前，他依然在告诫自己，他们答应释放他只不过是又一次“拉锯”而已。同样，在1973年，当有人告诉唐尼他即将被释放时，他对此表现得并不感兴趣，只说他想继续看完电视上正转播的乒乓球比赛。他回忆说：“我严格控制自己的期望。”

 

Create a Routine. Both men said that it was essential to busy themselves with a daily schedule, no matter how mundane each task might be. The prison environment, of course, mandated a certain routine, but within that general outline, as Downey put it, one could organize “a very full program every day.”

 

建立一套固定的日程

。这两人都表示，有必要给自己制定一个时间表，让自己每天都有事可做，哪怕是很小的任务都可以。当然，监狱环境本身就要求有一定的例行公事。但用唐尼的话说，在这个总体框架之下，还是可以“把每一天的计划安排得很满。”

 

I had my day very tightly scheduled—and if I missed some of my own selfappointed appointments, I’d feel uneasy. As a result, the days really moved along. Whereas if you just sit there and think about home, feeling sorry for yourself, then time can really drag.

 

我把自己的日子安排得非常紧

——如果我错过了自己指定的某项任务，就会觉得不安。这样一来，那些日子会一直不停向前走。而如果你只是坐在那里想家，顾影自怜，那么时间就会过得很慢。

 

Downey would leap out of bed at the prison’s morning whistle to begin a day that involved calisthenics, cleaning his cell, meals, reading and studying, listening to the radio, and “free time” with letters, books and magazines from home.[19] Fecteau developed a similar routine but varied it by the day of the week, later saying, “the weeks seemed long but the months went fast.” The Chinese occasionally allowed them periodicals like the New Yorker and Sports Illustrated. In addition, prayer and Bible study, as well as learning Chinese and Russian, composed a big part of Downey’s day. Ironically, CIA had assessed Downey in 1951 as disliking both being indoors and keeping to a fixed schedule.

 

监狱的起床号一响，唐尼就会从床上跳下来，开始新的一天：先是健身操，然后打扫他的牢房，吃饭，读书和学习，收听广播，然后是“自由活动”——阅读家里寄来的信，书籍以及杂志。[19 ]费克图也制定了类似的日程表，但不同的是，他还按星期计划每天做不同的内容。他后来说：“每个星期过得似乎很长，但每个月反倒过去得很快。”中国人有时允许他们阅读像《纽约客》和《体育画报》这类的期刊。除此以外，祷告与查经，以及学习中文和俄文，也构成了唐尼的一天中重要组成部分。具有讽刺意味的是，中央情报局在1951年曾对唐尼进行过评估，认为他既不喜欢呆在室内，也不喜欢按固定的时间表做事。

 

Get Physical. Both men credit exercise—pushups, situps, chinups, jogging, and other calisthenics for as long as two or three hours every day—as vital to coping with the inactivity of imprisonment. Fecteau commented:

 

坚持锻炼

。这两人都认为用锻炼来对付监禁期间的无所作为非常重要：每天做两三个小时的俯卧撑，仰卧起坐，引体向上，慢跑，还有其他健身操。费克图说：

 

I found that, although sometimes it was very difficult to make myself do it, it was a great help to my morale, especially if I was depressed. If I got up, pushed myself to do exercises, it would make a tremendous difference in my spirit. It also made me feel better, made me sleep better, but it was a lot more than just physical [benefit]. The effect on my mental outlook, what I thought of at the time as toughening my mind, was just tremendous.

 

我发现，虽然有时要费很大力气说服自己去这样做，但锻炼对我的士气是一个很大的帮助，特别当我很沮丧的时候。如果我起来，逼着自己做运动，它会使我的精神状态有巨大改观。它也会让我感觉更好，让我睡得更香，但它带来的好处远远不仅是身体上的。它会影响到我的精神面貌，当时我只是想增强意志，但是效果非常大。

 

Keep a Secret Space for Yourself. It is clear that an important coping mechanism was each man’s ability to fence off a part of his mind, deriving psychological benefit from keeping its very existence secret from the captors. Not only did Fecteau get a morale boost from being able to manufacture a consistent “cover confession,” he also kept in his mind the thought that, as an American and a CIA officer, he was in competition with the guard, the prison, and the Chinese regime. That helped his selfdiscipline in not shouting or complaining but enduring in silence. Both men reported that they enjoyed telling their captors the opposite of what they were thinking.

 

给自己保留一个隐密空间

。很明显，这两人所拥有的重要应对机制之一，就是他们有能力维护心中的某些秘密，不让关押他们的人知道。这给了他们带来心理上的好处。费克图不仅因为能够编造出滴水不漏的“供词”而提高了斗志，而且他也一直在心中保持这样的想法，即，作为一名美国人和一名中央情报局人员，他要与看守、监狱和中共政权一较高下。这有助于他保持自律，从不大叫或抱怨，而是默默忍受。这两人都报告说，他们喜欢跟关押他们的人说些与自己实际想法截然相反的话。

 

Both men used their imaginations to good effect. Downey enjoyed thinking, especially in the presence of an interrogator, guard, or prison official, about how his salary was accumulating—he knew that his $4,000ayear salary was something none of his captors would ever see. Fecteau said he taught himself to become “an expert daydreamer”:

 

这两人都利用他们的想像力取得良好效果。唐尼喜欢想像自己的薪水是如何越攒越多，特别是当审讯员、看守或监狱的官员在场的时候，更是如此。因为他知道，他那4000美元的年薪，是这些人一辈子也见不到的数目。费克图则说，他把自己训练成为了“白日做梦专家”：1

 

I remembered every kid in my sixthgrade class and where each one sat. I pictured myself leaving my house in Lynn and driving to Gloucester and every sight I’d see on the way…I could lose four hours just like that.

 

我努力回忆出自己六年级的那个班里每位同学的样子，和他们每个人坐在哪里。我想象自己从位于林恩市的家里出来，开车去格洛切斯特市上班，以及一路上能看到的每一处景象

...我可以这样消磨掉4个小时。

 

Fecteau also developed in his mind complex stories involving madeup characters—a boxer, a baseball player, a football player, an actor, and a songwriter—that became for him almost like watching a movie. As his imaginative skill increased, he could even mentally change “reels.”

 

费克图还在他的头脑里用一些虚构的人物构思出复杂的故事——拳击手，棒球球员，橄榄球运动员，演员和作曲家——这对他来说几乎就像是在看电影。随着他想象能力的提高，他甚至可以在头脑里更换“胶片”。

 

Remember that a Brain Cannot be Washed. In 1952, rumors of Chinese “brainwashing” were rampant because of the behavior of returned US prisoners from Chinese custody during the Korean War.[20] It is not surprising, then, that both Downey and Fecteau were fearful, particularly in the early years, that they would be turned into ideological zombies or traitors to the United States. Their concerns were heightened by Chinese rhetoric that they must show true repentance and remold their thinking. While they were allowed noncommunist reading materials, from about 1959 to 1969, they were required to participate in daily study and discussions of the works of Marx, Lenin, and Mao; the Communist Party platforms; and the like. Downey, at first, was agitated by this, but he did not resist, thinking that he could fake enough ideological reform to be granted a pardon when the 10th anniversary of their capture came along in 1962—in retrospect, a vain hope. In any case, he found that he had worried too much:

 

牢记大脑是不会被洗的

。1952年，由于从中国遣返回美国的朝鲜战争战俘们的种种行为，有关“洗脑”的传闻甚嚣尘上。[20]因此唐尼和费克图在被俘最初的几年里对此感到害怕，也就并不奇怪了。他们不想被变成满脑子某种主义的怪物，或成为美国的叛徒。中国方面要求他们必须表现出真正忏悔并改造自己思想，这些言论更让他们对此不安。虽然他们被允许阅读与共产主义无关的内容，但在大约1959年至1969年期间，他们每天都要参加学习讨论，内容涉及马列主义和毛泽东著作，以及共产党的理论等。开始的时候，唐尼对这很厌烦，但他并没有抵制，因为他想着可以假装做出了足够的思想转变，也许在1962年他们被捕10周年时可以得到特赦。现在回想起来，这是一个奢望。无论如何，他发现自己担心太多了：

 

One of the things that relaxed me was the eventual discovery that you cannot really be brainwashed…. There are some things they can’t change [and] basically I came out about the same as I went in…. They could scare you into saying just about anything, maybe scare me, I should say, but actually believing it is a much more difficult proposition.

 

当我最后发现一个人不可能真正被洗脑之后，就放心多了

...有些事他们改变不了，而我出狱时基本上跟我进去时没什么变化...他们可以唬得你把什么都说出来，甚至可以说让我感到害怕，但实际上真正相信那一套要困难得多。

 

Likewise, Fecteau observed that “they couldn’t wash my brains or change my thinking unless I changed.”

 

同样，费克图也指出，“除非我自己变了，否则他们不可能把我洗脑，或改变我想法。”

 

Both men recognized at least three benefits from the study sessions: They helped structure the days and pass the time; they provided human interaction, however stilted and contrived; and they gave insights into communist thinking and Chinese culture. As Fecteau put it: “I began to understand how they thought and what they meant when they said this or that to me. So then I began to look at the studies a bit differently [as] an opportunity to study them and to understand them.”

 

这两人都认为从学习班得到了至少三个好处：使他们的日子过得更有规律，并可以消磨时间; 为他们提供了人际交往，尽管非常的生硬和不自然；让他们获得了对共产主义思想和中国文化的了解。正如费克图所说：“我开始理解了他们是怎么想的，以及当他们对我说这个或那个时，他们的意思是什么。于是我开始把学习班看作一个研究他们、了解他们的好机会。”

 

Care for Each Other. Although Downey and Fecteau saw each other infrequently during the two decades, they developed a communications system. In the first years, they used distinctive coughs to track each other’s whereabouts, or wrote words or sports scores in the dust where the other man would see it. Later, they found ways to deliver notes and also used sotto voce comments when possible.[21] They were always in the same prison, and not far from each other, which kept their spirits up more than if they had been imprisoned in separate cities.

 

相互关照

。虽然在那20年里唐尼和费克图很少见到对方，但他们研究出了一套联系方式。在最初几年里，他们用独特的咳嗽声来跟踪对方的位置，或在对方可能看到的地方，在尘土上写下一些单词或体育比赛的分数。后来，他们想出了方法传递纸条。在有可能的情况下，他们也会压低声音彼此沟通。[21]他们总是被关在同一监狱中，彼此相隔不远。假如他们被分别囚禁在不同城市里，其精神状态不会这么好。1

 

Even through the years of solitary confinement, each man drew comfort from the thought of his nearby comrade. When Fecteau was told of his impending release, his first question was whether Downey would be coming out, too. After release, Fecteau spurned lucrative offers to tell his story publicly because of the impact it might have on Downey’s fate. To this day, the men remain close friends.

 

即使他们被单独监禁多年，“自己的同志就在不远处”这样的想法，总是会让他们得到安慰。当费克图被告知即将获释后，他的第一个问题是，唐尼是否也会被释放。获释后，费克图并没有被高酬所诱惑，公开讲述自己的故事以获得名利，因为他知道那样做可能会影响到唐尼的命运。直到现在，这两人依然是亲密的朋友。

 

Find Humor Where You Can. In recruiting Downey and Fecteau, CIA had noted that each man had a welldeveloped sense of humor. This quality, far more than any particular training, helped sustain them. There was little in their situation that made for flippancy, but they were able to see the humor in the incongruous and the absurd. Downey, the more serious of the two, was amused at the aboutface required in his study sessions, when he was expounding the Soviet line about Albania before he became aware that the new Chinese line was antiSoviet! Fecteau reflected for long periods on humorous stories he would hear from cellmates: about the man jailed for fortune telling who produced a pack of cards in his cell, or the man ridiculed by his cellmates for believing that the world rested on the back of huge turtle. He was amused by a book he was given, written by an Australian communist, that glowingly described Chinese prison conditions quite at variance with his own experience.

 

尽量保持幽默

。在招聘唐尼和费克图时，中情局曾注意到这两人都有极强的幽默感。这种品质对他们熬过这段岁月的帮助，远远超过任何培训的效果。他们的处境很少能有什么笑料，但他们能够从不协调和荒谬中看到幽默。唐尼相对比较严肃，但他对自己在学习班里做180度立场转变的经历感到很好笑。当时他按苏联的观点阐述了对阿尔巴尼亚的看法，但随后却意识到中国的新立场是反对苏联的！费克图则反复回想从同牢犯人那里听来的幽默故事。有位犯人是因为算命被抓，在牢房里自制了一副纸牌。另外一位相信地球是驮在一只大乌龟背上的，因而受到其他犯人的嘲笑。他还被狱方给他的一本澳大利亚共产党人写的书逗乐了。那书中把中国监狱里的条件写得天花乱坠，跟他自己的亲身体验形成鲜明对比。

 

Be Patient. Because of insufficient training, both men acknowledged it took several years to develop effective coping strategies. At the beginning, each thought he was going crazy. Fecteau says he started to have “mental aberrations”: “The walls started moving in on me. I would put my foot out in front of me and measure the distance to be sure the wall wasn’t really moving.” Downey, besides being “extremely scared,” was frustrated to the point of despair, seeing every day in prison as a day robbed from him. As the men learned how to deal with their fate, it became easier. Fecteau did not have a vivid imagination at first, but he developed one as a skill. Downey maintained that, had he been released after only five years, he would have come out in far worse shape than he did after 20 years.

 

要有耐心

。因为缺乏足够的训练，这两人都承认自己在过了好几年之后才制定出有效的应对策略。刚开始的时候，他们都觉得自己会疯掉。费克图说，他开始出现“精神异常”：“墙壁好像在向我挤过来。我得把脚伸到面前，量出距离，以确认墙壁没有真的在动。”唐尼除了“非常害怕”之外，还曾沮丧到了绝望的地步。他认为在监狱中的每一天，都相当于从生命中被抢走了一天。随着他们学会了如何应对自己的命运，日子慢慢变得容易起来。起初费克图的想象力并没有那么生动，但他把它作为一门技能加以培养。唐尼认为，如果他仅仅被关押5年后就被释放，那么他那时的情况将比关押20年后再释放更糟糕。

 

On the Home Front

 

国内方面的情况

 

It was the exemplary manner in which CIA headquarters handled Downey’s and Fecteau’s affairs that partially redeems the disaster that led to their predicament. Once the Chinese had broken the news that the two were alive, the Agency quickly restored them to the active payroll. DCI Dulles had them moved administratively from the Far East Division to a special list maintained by the Office of Personnel (OP). OP officer George Cary handled their affairs until 1957; thereafter, it was Ben DeFelice.

 

中央情报局总部对唐尼和费克图事件的出色处理，在一定程度上补偿了当初导致他们身陷困境的灾难。一旦中国透露出这两个人还活着的消息，中情局迅速恢复了他们的现役人员身份。中情局局长杜勒斯将他们的行政关系从远东司转到由人事处掌管的一个特别名单上。在1957年之前，人事处官员乔治·卡里（George Cary）一直在负责处理这件事。此后，由本·德费利斯（Ben DeFelice）负责。

 

Although no precedent existed for administering the affairs of civilian federal employees subjected to lengthy foreign imprisonment, OP creatively applied existing law in managing the three primary areas: pay and allotments, promotions, and maintenance of accrued funds. In addition, OP representatives took on the delicate matter of dealing with the men’s families. In making decisions on behalf of Downey and Fecteau, OP drew guidance from the Missing Persons Act of 1942—intended for military MIAs—and subsequent Agency regulations.

 

虽然没有管理联邦文职雇员被别国长期囚禁的先例，但人事处创造性地运用现有法律，在工资和养家费、级别晋升、以及管理不断累积的资金这三个主要领域进行了处理。此外，人事处的代表还担负起了与这两人的家庭进行沟通的微妙任务。在有必要代唐尼和费克图做出决定时，人事处按照原本用于部队失踪人员的《失踪人员法案》（制定于1942年）和随后的中情局有关规定做了处理。1

 

Pay was the easiest area to address. Keeping the men’s pay accounts in a current status would allow both the accrual of pay and the immediate payment of funds upon their release. OP also ensured that the men received separation allowances and post differentials, which were applied retroactively and carried for the entire period of their imprisonment in recognition of the “excessively adverse” conditions of the two men’s “foreign assignment.” Deductions were made for federal income taxes and held in escrow until such time as the men could file.

 

工资是最容易解决的问题。保持这两人的工资帐户长期有效，将使得他们可以累积薪水，并使得他们一旦获释，立即可以支付这笔资金。人事处还确保他们能得到分居津贴和岗位津贴，以补偿这两人在执行“境外任务”中所处的“极端不利”境地。这两项都具有追溯性，在他们整个监禁期都有效。他们的工资预扣了联邦收入税，所扣税款存入托管账户，直至他们能够报税之时为止。

 

In 1958, when it looked as though the men would not be released for a long time, DCI Dulles approved an OP plan to promote them from GS7 to GS11, with a schedule of interim promotions and step increases applied in a graduated, retroactive manner over the previous five years. Once their ranks were in line with their contemporaries, Agency officials ensured regular promotions and step increases as if they had continued unimpeded in their careers. Eventually the Director of Personnel determined that Downey and Fecteau should be promoted to the journeyman level during their imprisonment, which was set at GS13; then one grade was added to help compensate for the deprivations of captivity. So the terminal rank for the two was established at GS14, to which both were promoted in 1971, just before Fecteau’s release. Both men, after their release, were startled to learn of the promotions and that they were earning some $22,000 per year—they were still thinking in terms of their 1952 GS7 salaries of just over $4,000.

 

1958年，当看起来这两人好像还要经过很长一段时间才会被释放时，局长杜勒斯批准了人事处的一项计划，将两人的级别从GS7晋升到GS11，并将它按时间表平摊在过去5年的时间里，逐级晋升。等他们的级别达到了与同龄人一致之后，中情局官员还保证了此后他们定期得到晋升，并逐步提高了工资，就如同他们的职业生涯仍在继续一样。最终，人事处主任决定唐尼和费克图在监禁期间应该被提升到GS13级的熟练工（journeyman）水平，并在此级别上再加一级，以弥补他们被囚禁的困境。因此，这两人的最终级别达到了GS14。他们是在1971年晋升到这个级别的，费克图在此之后几个月就获得了释放。这两个人获释后，都对他们得到的晋升和每年约两万两千美元的年收入感到惊讶，他们的思维仍然停留在自己1952年时GS7的级别和刚刚超过4000美元的年薪上。

 

Of bigger concern to OP was handling the accrued funds responsibly. DeFelice later outlined his philosophy: “We couldn’t give them [back] their years of imprisonment, but we could at least assure financial security for their future.” Doing so required considerable ingenuity. The accrued funds were initially invested in Series E savings bonds, but the sums soon passed the $10,000 annual ceiling. From 1960 to 1963, the funds were invested in savings accounts under pseudonyms, but this had to be abandoned when the Internal Revenue Service started requiring banks to report interest income to depositors. Then, for about a year, the Agency simply credited the accounts with interest payments at the prevailing bank rate. Finally, in late 1964, OP got DCI John McCone to approve investing the funds through a covert proprietary company. When Fecteau was released in 1971, his accumulated account came to almost $140,000; Downey’s in 1973 came to more than $170,000. Each figure represented a nest egg of about seven times each man’s annual salary as a GS14 at the time.

 

对人事处来说，负责地管理两人不断累积的资金是一个更大的挑战。德费利斯后来总结了他的观点：“我们不能追回他们多年被监禁的时光，但我们至少可以保证他们未来在财务上不用发愁。”做到这一点需要花费相当大的心血。最初的累计资金被用来投资在E系列储蓄债券上，但数额很快超过了每年一万美元的上限。从1960年到1963年，这笔资金用假名存到了储蓄账户上，但当国税局开始要求银行向存款人报告利息收入时，人事处不得不放弃这种方法。然后有大约一年的时间，中情局自己按当时的现行银行利率向这些帐户支付利息。最后，在1964年年底，中情局局长约翰·麦科恩（John McCone）批准将这些资金通过一个秘密的下属公司进行投资。当费克图在1971年获释时，他的帐户里累计了近14万美元; 而唐尼在1973年获释时，他的账户里面有超过17万美元。这两个数字差不多是这两人当时的GS14级别年薪的7倍左右。1

 

Family Issues

 

家庭问题1

 

Taking care of the families also required imaginative management. Downey and Fecteau were allowed monthly packages from family, which they relied on for morale and physical health—the food and vitamin supplements augmented their sparse diet. While Downey’s mother could afford the cost of these packages, it was a financial hardship for Fecteau’s parents. Legally, the Agency could not simply give them the money to pay for the packages. Beginning in 1959, DeFelice’s creative solution was to have the Agency apply an “equalization allowance” to the men’s pay—typically used to offset the excess cost of living at a duty post; it was a stretch to apply this to life in a Chinese cell. This amount—several hundred dollars per year—was passed along to the families by allotment. It was made retroactive to the date of their capture.

 

照顾好两人的家庭也需要管理部门动动脑筋。中方允许唐尼和费克图的家庭每月给他们寄一个包裹。这对他俩的士气和身体健康都很重要——食物和维生素补品可以补充他们单调的饮食。虽然唐尼的母亲能负担得起寄给他的包裹费用，但是对费克图的父母来说，这构成了经济上的困难。在法律上，中情局不能直接给他们钱支付包裹的费用。从1959年开始，德费利斯创造性地想出一个办法，即中情局替这两人申请“均衡津贴”加到他们的工资上——这项津贴通常是被用来抵消岗位所在地过高的生活费用的。把它用来抵消中国监狱里的生活费用，说起来比较勉强。这笔钱每年数百美元，以养家费的名义发给了这两人的家属，而且是从他俩被逮捕之日开始补发。

 

Allotments for the families were authorized based on the presumption of the men’s wishes. Educational expenses for Fecteau’s twin daughters from his first marriage, for example, were covered by allotments from his pay account. When CIA representatives visited Fecteau’s parents and saw their modest standard of living based on a fixed retirement income, allotments to them from Fecteau’s pay account were increased, based on the assumption that Fecteau would have so decided.

 

给他们家庭的养家费，是在假定他俩同意的基础上被授权执行的。例如，费克图第一次婚姻中所生的双胞胎女儿的教育费用，即从他的工资帐户以养家费的名义拨款支付。当中央情报局的代表探望了费克图的父母，看到他们依靠固定的退休工资维持着微薄的生活水平后，便决定从费克图的工资帐户中增加养家费的拨款给他的父母，因为中情局假定费克图本人也会作出如此决定。

 

The Agency also helped family members with the several trips they made to visit the prisoners, starting in 1958 when both mothers and Downey’s brother went. CIA could do nothing officially to facilitate the trips because diplomatic relations did not exist with the People’s Republic of China and US policy required the prisoners’ CIA affiliation to be concealed. The Agency gave the travelers briefings on what to expect—with regard to the communist authorities and the prisoners’ likely attitudes—and what topics and behavior to avoid. Because such trips were beyond the means of the families—and to keep the prisoners’ accounts from being depleted—DCI Dulles authorized the disbursement of Agency funds to the families through intermediaries for travel expenses.[22]

 

中情局还资助这两人的家庭成员几次去中国探望他们。从1958年开始，他俩的母亲和唐尼的兄弟都去探望了他们。中央情报局无法正式出面安排这些探监之旅，因为当时不存在同中华人民共和国的正式外交关系，而且美国的政策要求不能暴露这两名囚犯与中央情报局的关系。中情局向去探监的人通报了他们可能会见到的情形——主要是关于中共当局和囚犯的可能态度，以及应该避免什么样的话题和行为。因为这样的旅行超出了这些家庭的经济能力，同时也为了避免这两人的工资账户数额剧减，局长杜勒斯授权通过中介机构，用中情局的资金支付了这两个家庭的旅行费用。[22]

 

As the Agency’s point of contact for the families, Ben DeFelice held thousands of phone conversations over the years, especially with Downey’s mother. Mary Downey was strong willed and capable of lecturing the most senior government officials in every administration from Eisenhower to Nixon on the need for the United States to do more to free her son. DeFelice reported he talked to Mary Downey at least weekly, for up to several hours at a time. Costs of the calls were always borne by the Agency. DeFelice and other OP officials also wrote hundreds of letters and made dozens of visits to family members over the years.

 

作为中情局和这些家庭的联络人，本·德费利斯多年来跟他们——尤其是唐尼的母亲——进行过成千上万次的电话交流。玛丽·唐尼是位意志坚强的人，她能当面教训从艾森豪威尔到尼克松的历届政府最高层行政官员，告诉他们美国需要做出更多的努力来使她的儿子获得释放。德费利斯报告说，他至少每周都会跟玛丽·唐尼通电话，有时一次通话会长达几个小时的时间。这些电话费总是由中情局支付的。德费利斯和其他的人事处官员在这些年期间，也曾给两人的家庭写去数以百计的信件，并做过数十次登门拜访。1

 

Release and Readjustment

 

获释与调整1

 

In the end, of course, this tragic tale becomes a happy one, with the men restored to freedom and the Agency continuing its extraordinary efforts to see these extraordinary men into ordinary retirement. Fecteau’s release in December 1971, and Downey’s 15 months later, came about in the context of the warming of relations between the United States and China. In particular, 1971 was the year of “ping pong diplomacy,” the lifting of US trade restrictions, National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger’s secret mission to Beijing, and the seating of the People’s Republic of China at the UN. That fall, the two captives were taken to a Beijing department store—for the first time—for new clothing, including overcoats. Fecteau remarked to Downey that “either we are on our way out or we are going to stay in for another 20 years.”

 

当然，到最后这两人终于恢复了自由。而中情局也继续做出大量努力，保障这两人得以正常退休，将一个悲剧变成了大团圆。费克图于1971年12月获释，而唐尼在15个月后获释。大约在此期间，美国和中国的关系逐渐升温。尤其是1971年出现了“乒乓外交”，美国取消了贸易限制，国家安全顾问亨利·基辛格秘密访问北京，联合国恢复了中华人民共和国的席位。那年秋天，这两名俘虏第一次被带到了北京的百货公司购买包括外套在内的新衣服。费克图对唐尼说：“要么是咱们快出去了，要么是他们打算再关上咱们20年。”

 

On 9 December 1971, Fecteau was summoned to a tribunal, which informed him of his impending release. Asking about Downey, Fecteau was told that Downey’s case was more serious and that he would not be going. Fecteau was allowed to leave some of his belongings for Downey, but because a guard stood all the while in front of Downey’s cell, Fecteau could not communicate with him. After a train trip to Canton, Fecteau found himself walking across the LoWu bridge to Hong Kong. A British army officer gave him a cigarette and a beer, which he described as “incredible.” Fecteau had served 19 years and 14 days of his 20year sentence.

 

1971年12月9日，费克图被传唤到法庭，通知他即将获释。费克图询问他们，唐尼是否也会被释放。他们说唐尼的情形比较严重，他不会马上被放。他们允许费克图把他的一些物品留给唐尼，但由于一名警卫一直站在唐尼的牢房前，费克图无法与他交谈。费克图坐火车前往广州，然后步行穿过罗湖桥来到香港。一名英国军官给了他一支香烟和一瓶啤酒，他对此用“难以置信”来形容。费克图在狱中服了19年零14天的刑，而他的刑期是二十年。

 

The CIA evacuation plan, which had existed since 1955, was put in motion and soon Fecteau was being examined at Valley Forge Military Hospital. His physical condition astounded the doctors,[23] but his demeanor was extremely reserved—not used to interacting with people, he spoke in a low voice only when spoken to and preferred to have decisions made for him. Within days, however, he began opening up and taking charge of his new life, and soon he was back at work giving interviews on his experience. Worried about Downey, Fecteau was careful to say in public that he harbored no bitterness toward the Chinese people or their government.

 

中情局随即启动制定于1955年的疏散计划，很快费克图便被送到福吉谷军医院接受身体检查。他的身体状况让医生们吃惊，[23]，但他的举止非常内向，不习惯与人交往。只有在别人跟他讲话的时候，他才会用低沉的声音开口说话。而且他宁愿别人替他作出决定。但是在几天之内，他变得开放起来，主动适应起新生活。不久，他便重新开始工作，向别人讲述自己过去的经历。出于担心唐尼的安全，费克图在公众场合说话非常小心，声称他对中国人民或他们的政府没有任何仇恨。

 

At the time of Fecteau’s release, Beijing announced that Downey’s sentence had been reduced from life imprisonment to five years from that date—a bitter disappointment both to the Agency and to the Downey family, particularly his mother, by then in her seventies and in failing health. Despite the highlevel talks and interventions, it was her severe stroke in early March 1973 that accomplished her son’s release. President Nixon’s appeal to Beijing on humanitarian grounds—together with his admission the previous month in a press conference that Downey was a CIA employee—led to his freedom after 20 years, 3 months, and 14 days in prison. He crossed the border into Hong Kong on 12 March, noting that the salute he received from a British soldier at his crossing was the first act of dignity shown him in 20 years. He arrived at his mother’s bedside the next day. Recovered enough to recognize her son, Mary Downey admonished him: “You’re a celebrity now, don’t let it go to your head.”

 

 

 

 

在费克图获释时，北京宣布唐尼的刑期已从无期徒刑减至从该日起5年——这对于中情局和唐尼的家人来说都非常失望，特别是他那当时已经七十多岁而且身体不好的母亲。尽管有很多高层的会谈和干预，但实际上是由于她在1973年3月上旬严重中风，才最终促成了她儿子的获释。尼克松总统向北京发出基于人道主义理由的呼吁——而他在前一个月的新闻发布会上已经承认唐尼是中情局雇员——这使得唐尼在被监禁了20年3个月又14天后，终于获得了自由。他在3月12日穿过边境进入香港。他说，在过境点一名英国士兵向他敬礼，那是他在20年里第一次感受到尊严。第二天他就来到了自己的母亲身边。玛丽·唐尼当时已经恢复到能够认出他是自己的儿子。她告诫他说：“你现在是个名人了，但不要让它冲昏你的头脑。”

 

Getting on with Life

 

适应生活1

 

Both men came home in good physical and mental shape, free of grudges, surprised at their GS14 rank and accumulated pay, stunned by changes in the American landscape and culture, and grateful for what the Agency had done with their affairs. Both were restored to CIA’s East Asia Division as operations officers and underwent a series of debriefings.[24] Each received the Distinguished Intelligence Medal for “courageous performance” in enduring “sufferings and deprivations, measured in decades, with fortitude [and an] unshakable will to survive and with a preserving faith in his country.” Fecteau also was awarded the Intelligence Medal of Merit for his conduct following his release, when, in order to protect Downey’s chances for release, he refused lucrative offers from the media and publishers to tell his story.

 

两人重返故乡时都有着良好的身体和精神状态，胸无怨气，对他们GS14的职级和积累的工资感到惊讶，对美国的环境和文化的变化感到震惊，并且对中情局在处理与自己有关的事务上的所作所为表示感谢。两人以行动人员的身份回到中央情报局的东亚司工作，并且进行了一系列的情况汇报。[24]他俩都因“英勇表现”而获颁杰出情报勋章，以表彰他们在经受“几十年的困苦中所体现出来的毅力和不可动摇的生存意志，以及对自己国家的坚定信念”。费克图在获释后为了保护唐尼的出狱机会，拒绝了媒体和出版商为让他讲述自己的经历而许诺的高额报酬。为此，他还被授予了情报功勋奖章。

 

Both men, understandably, were interested in qualifying for retirement, but even with all their years in prison, they were short of the necessary 25 years. To make up the deficit, DeFelice made sure that both received all the annual leave they had accumulated over two decades—90 percent of which had technically been forfeited but was now restored. OP also helped the men gain all the creditable government service due them—both had worked temporary jobs with the post office in the 1940s, and Fecteau had served in the Merchant Marine for a year. The final trick up DeFelice’s sleeve was his initiative, following the Pentagon’s example with its returning military POWs, to add one year’s “convalescent leave” to each man’s accumulated sick leave. This allowed Downey and Fecteau to attend to their own affairs while drawing full CIA salaries for some time after coming home. Downey used the time to go to Harvard Law School, and Fecteau worked on home projects, took care of his parents, and sought work as a probation officer. Fecteau qualified for retirement in 1976; Downey, in 1977.[25]

 

 

 

 

两个人都希望自己已经达到了退休的资格，这也是可以理解的。但即使算进在监狱中的所有年份，他们也还是没有到退休所需的25年服务期。为了弥补这个差距，德费利斯设法使这两人都重新获得超过20年期间内的所有年假——此前其中90%都算做自动放弃了，但现在被重新恢复有效。人事处还尽力帮助这两人统计他们应得的政府服务期——他们都曾在20世纪40年代在邮局做过临时工，费克图还曾在商船局服务过一年。德费利斯的最后一招，是他根据五角大楼处理回国战俘的先例，提出为这两人增加一年的“康复假”。这使得唐尼和费克图在返回家乡后，有一定时间来照顾自家的事情，同时照常领取中央情报局的工资。唐尼利用这段时间去了哈佛大学法学院读书，而费克图则在家进行装修，照顾他的父母，并找了份假释官的工作。费克图在1976年取得了退休资格; 而唐尼于1977年也取得了这个资格。[25]

 

Richard Fecteau and John Downey have lived up to their desire to focus on the future and not dwell on the past. They have refused to make careers out of their experience and instead have lived full lives since returning to America:

 

理查德·费克图和约翰·唐尼实践了他们自己的愿望——着眼于未来，而不是纠缠于过去。他们没有把自己局限于过去的经历中，而是自从返回美国后便一直过着充实的生活：

 

Downey became a respected judge in Connecticut, specializing in juvenile matters. Now retired, he continues to take on cases as needed, working three or four days a week. The Judge John T. Downey Courthouse in New Haven is named for him. He married in 1975; his ChineseAmerican wife, Audrey, was born in Manchuria not far from where the plane was shot down. They have an adult son.

 

唐尼成为一名受到尊重的康涅狄格州法官，专业处理青少年事务案件。现在虽然已经退休了，但根据需要，他还在每星期工作3至4天，继续处理案件。位于纽黑文市的“约翰·T ·唐尼法庭”就是以他的名字命名的。他于1975年结婚，他的美籍华裔妻子奥黛丽，就出生于中国东北，离他的飞机被击落处不远。他们有一个儿子已经成年。2

 

Fecteau returned to his alma mater, Boston University, as assistant athletic director, retiring in 1989. He reconnected with his adult daughters, who were two years old when he was shot down, and he remarried his first wife, who had kept him in her prayers while he was in prison.

 

费克图回到他的母校波士顿大学担任体育事务副主任，在1989年退休。他和已经成年的女儿们重新恢复了联系，他被击落时，她们才两岁。他还与前妻复了婚。他在牢里时，她一直都在为他祈祷。1

 

Both have maintained friendships with former colleagues and retain their sense of Agency affiliation.

 

这两人都和以前的同事保持着友谊，而且对中情局有着归属感。

 

DCI George Tenet brought Downey and Fecteau back to the CIA in 1998, 25 years after Downey’s release, to present them with the Director’s Medal. Their story, Tenet declared, “is one of the most remarkable in the history of the Central Intelligence Agency.” On the occasion, Fecteau affirmed “This is still my outfit and always will be,” and Downey declared “I am proud to be one of you.” Tenet spoke of their “extraordinary fidelity”—words also inscribed on their medals— and told them: “Like it or not, you are our heroes.” Downey, speaking for himself and for Fecteau, replied: “We’re at the age where, if you want to call us heroes, we’re not going to argue anymore, [but] we know better.”

 

在1998年，唐尼获释25年后，中情局局长乔治·特尼特（George Tenet）把唐尼和费克图请回到中情局，向他们颁发局长奖章。特内特说，他们的事迹“是在中央情报局的历史上最引人注目的故事之一。”在典礼上，费克图明确表示：“这里现在仍然是，今后也永远会是我的单位。”唐尼则表示：“我很自豪能够成为你们中的一员。”特尼特赞扬了他们“非同寻常的忠诚”——他们的奖章上也刻着这些词——并告诉他们：“不管愿意不愿意，你们都是我们的英雄。”唐尼代表自己和费克图回答说：“到了我们这个岁数，如果你们非要把我们称为英雄，我们也没有力气再和你们争论，[但]我们心里有数。”

 

John Downey, 22 when he began his captivity and almost 43 when released, is now 76. Richard Fecteau, 25 when shot down and 44 on his return, will be 80 next August. Their story, and the lessons we derive from it, will long outlive them. Their experience in China teaches many things: the importance of good decisions in the field and the costs of bad ones; the ability of men to say “it’s not over” when life seems to be at an end; the resilience to get through a bad day—7,000 times in a row; and the strength gained from faith that one is still cared about. But their experience back home is also inspirational, for it teaches us that perhaps the most enduring lesson of all is the absolute necessity of making every day lived in freedom count.