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刘小波获奖的3大好处:
送交者:  2010年10月10日14:47:37 于 [世界时事论坛] 发送悄悄话
刘小波获奖的3大好处:

1,西方国家将有机会被强大后的任何国家殖民300年;

2,乔治华盛顿指出的六毛终于有主人了;

3,华人中想让自己家妻女被殖民的都有机会了。


鼓吹西式宪政民主不可阻挡的人是什么? 华盛顿这么说:  6M








获个奖还要让国家陪上"殖民三百年",不是流氓也是无赖。

说中国人缺乏创造力,“中国只有一堆非驴非马的大杂烩”;“孔子是个庸才”,“我无所谓爱国、叛国,你要说我叛国,我就叛国!就承认自己是挖祖坟的不孝子孙,且以此为荣。”从这些说法看,刘晓波不是愤青,是
流氓


The Federalist Papers



The Federalist Papers Welcome to our Federalist Papers e-text. The Federalist Papers were written and published during the years 1787 and 1788 in several New York State newspapers to persuade New York voters to ratify the proposed constitution.
In total, the Federalist Papers consist of 85 essays outlining how this new government would operate and why this type of government was the best choice for the United States of America. All of the essays were signed "PUBLIUS" and the actual authors of some are under dispute, but the general consensus is that Alexander Hamilton wrote 52, James Madison wrote 28, and John Jay contributed the remaining five.

James Madison postcardAlexander Hamilton postcardJohn Jay postcard


The Federalist Papers remain today as an excellent reference for anyone who wants to understand the U.S. Constitution.
We have three ways to browse the Federalist Papers. Thee first two are both in numerical order. Frames make it slightly easier to flip back and forth between different pages. The third is by author.




zt 大国如海鲜2010年10月09日02:57:49
现在有人在以各种方式拼命鼓吹西式宪政民主,不久前,有一篇《南方周末》的热烈歌颂西式宪政民主的文章广为流传。拿来看了一下,感觉作者非常"诚实",很"坦然" 地把西式宪政民主的本质给揭示出来了。现在摘取其中最精彩的一段文字与大家分享——
  
  “……制宪代表们幻想:有一个人,像华盛顿那样,不用自我报名,也不用推荐,凭着战功、声望和人格,静待选民把选票堆到他身上。可是,美国历史上只出现了一个华盛顿,两次全票当选。此后, 再也没有一个人获得如此殊荣。


  杰斐逊打破了这个格局。他的表现说明:需 要有人出来竞选总统,为此,要拉帮结派,组织政党,要自我夸耀,诋毁对方。政治斗争,尤其是权力争夺,不可能那么温良恭俭让,要请客吃饭,要做文章。要宣 传,不惜虚张声势,要诋毁,不惜歪曲事实。被动的总统选举,从此变为主动的总统竞选。而总统竞选,充满人间烟火味儿。……”(美国宪政史话《南方周末》第28期 )    
    
  ——大家看清楚了没有?要搞西式宪政民主,就必须 “虚张声势,要诋毁,不惜歪曲事实”,也就是说,搞西式宪政民主,就必须大肆(花钱竞选和占领媒体) 制造和传播虚假信息,造谣诋毁,不惜歪曲事实,大搞欺骗 (直到胜出,然后用更大的选出来维护前面的造假)。
    
  问题是,竟争执政权的政客和他们的团队大肆制造和传播虚假信息,造谣诋毁,歪曲事实,是要欺骗谁呢?西式宪政民主下的大选的参与者只有两方——竟争执政权的政客和全体选民。是用来骗竟争对手吗?——不论你怎么骗,你的竟争对手都绝对不会把选票投给你。所以,这些虚假信息肯定不是用来欺骗竟争对手的,只能是用来欺骗全体选民的。
    
  《南方周末》这篇"雄文",一下子就把以前给西式宪政民主美丽的包装给撕掉了,把西式宪政民主的本质彻底暴露给读者了——要搞西方竟争式的宪政民主, 就必须“自我夸耀,要请客吃饭,要做文章。要宣传,不惜虚张声势,要诋毁,不惜歪曲事实”来欺骗全体人民,骗术越高越好,谁能把多数人民骗倒,谁就能得到 执政权。
    
  有人可能会满不在乎地说,人民的眼睛是雪亮的,虽然政客们要欺骗人民,但人民不可能被骗倒!

  人民真的不可能被骗倒吗?大家也知道,在西方宪政民主国家中,对于商业欺诈行为的惩处是非常重的,一个商业欺诈官司就能让行骗者倾家荡产,家破人亡,甚至有终身的牢狱之灾!法律之所以严惩行骗者,就是因为人民的辩别能力不高,很容易被专业的骗子骗倒,损失惨重,所以要用严刑峻法来威慑不法分子。
    
  但让人百思不得其解的是,西方宪政民主国家,却没有任何一部法律来惩处在大选中对广大人民的政治欺骗行为,奇怪不奇怪?难道说在商业活动中弱智的人民,到了政治活动中,个个都变得明智无比了?从常识来说,这是绝对不可能的,大家请看《美国宪法原理》中的这段话——
    
  It is a just observation, that the people commonly INTEND the PUBLIC GOOD. This often applies to their very errors. But their good sense would despise the adulator who should pretend that they always REASON RIGHT about the MEANS of promoting it. They know from experience that they sometimes err; and the wonder is that they so seldom err as they do, beset, as they continually are, by the wiles of parasites and sycophants, by the snares of the ambitious, the avaricious, the desperate, by the artifices of men who possess their confidence more than they deserve it, and of those who seek to possess rather than to deserve it. (The Federalist Papers No. 71)
  
  “人民普遍地是从公益出发的。但这一点常亦用来说明人民群众的错误。但是,人民群众从常识出发是会蔑视阿谀奉承的人的,这些人胡说人民群众无时不能正 确找出促进公益的手段。人民群众从自己的经验知道他们自己有时候是会犯错误的;人民群众终日受那些寄生虫和马屁精的欺骗,野心家、贪污犯、亡命徒的坑害, 受那些不值得信任却为人所信任的人,以及不应得而巧取豪夺的人的耍弄,他们经常受到这样一些干扰,却并不常犯错误,勿宁说是个美妙的神话。”(《美国宪法 原理》第七十一篇)
    
  这段话非常诚实地告诉我们,人民在政客们精心编排的谎言的狂轰滥炸之下,不犯错误 “勿宁说倒是个美妙的神话”!可见,在商业活动中并不高明的人民群众,在政治活动中一样经不起政客的欺骗。
    
  既然人民参与政治活动时也不比在商业活动中更明智,那为什么西方宪政民主国家宁愿用严刑峻法来制止商业活动中的欺骗,却不肯制定任何一部法来来惩罚政 客们在政治活动中对人民的政治欺骗呢?难道说政治欺骗没有多大的危害性吗?商业欺骗,是什对人民中的个体,而政治欺骗,骗的是全体人民。看来,在西式宪政 民主体制下,真的是窃钩者诛,窃国者侯!奇怪吗?——一点也不奇怪,正如这篇文章说的,造假和欺骗本身就是西式宪政民主的生命,没有了造假和欺骗,西式宪政民主就玩不下去了,就要死亡了。
    
  在中国大陆现在也有一批人极力鼓吹西式宪政民主,这些人到是什么样的人呢?其实《美国宪法原理》已经把这些人的老底给揭穿了,就是那些能够从西式宪政民主中捞到好处的人,他们就是——


parasites(寄生虫)、
sycophants(马屁精)、
ambitious(野心家)、
avaricious(贪污犯)、
desperate(亡命徒)、
men who possess their confidence more than they deserve it(虚伪者)、those who seek to possess rather than to deserve it(流氓强盗)。







看原版:


Founding Fathers Federalist Papers


AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficiency of the subsistingfederal government, you are called upon to deliberate on a newConstitution for the United States of America. The subject speaksits own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothingless than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare ofthe parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in manyrespects the most interesting in the world.



It has been frequentlyremarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people ofthis country, by their conduct and example, to decide the importantquestion, whether societies of men are really capable or not ofestablishing good government from reflection and choice, or whetherthey are forever destined to depend for their political constitutionson accident and force. If there be any truth in the remark, thecrisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be regardedas the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong electionof the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be consideredas the general misfortune of mankind.



This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those ofpatriotism, to heighten the solicitude which all considerate andgood men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choiceshould be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests,unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected withthe public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be wishedthan seriously to be expected. The plan offered to our deliberationsaffects too many particular interests, innovates upon too manylocal institutions, not to involve in its discussion a varietyof objects foreign to its merits, and of views, passions and prejudiceslittle favorable to the discovery of truth.
.

..
...


The Importance of the Union (1-14)

FEDERALIST No. 1 General Introduction Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 2 Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence John Jay
FEDERALIST No. 3 Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) John Jay
FEDERALIST No. 4 Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) John Jay
FEDERALIST No. 5 Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) John Jay
FEDERALIST No. 6 Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 7 Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States (con't) Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 8 The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 9 The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 10 The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection (con't) James Madison
FEDERALIST No. 11 The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 12 The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 13 Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 14 Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered James Madison

Defects of the Articles of Confederation (15-22)

FEDERALIST No. 15 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 16 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 17 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 18 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Alexander Hamilton and James Madison
FEDERALIST No. 19 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Alexander Hamilton and James Madison
FEDERALIST No. 20 The Insufficiency fo the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Alexander Hamilton and James Madison
FEDERALIST No. 21 Other Defects of the Present Confederation Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 22 Other Defects of the Present Confederation (con't) Alexander Hamilton

Arguments for the Type of Government Contained in the Constitution (23-36)

FEDERALIST No. 23 The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 24 The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 25 The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered (con't) Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 26 The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 27 The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (con't) Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 28 The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (con't) Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 29 Concerning the Militia Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 30 Concerning the General Power of Taxation Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 31 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 32 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 33 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 34 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 35 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 36 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Alexander Hamilton

The Republican Form of Government (37-51)

FEDERALIST No. 37 Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government James Madison
FEDERALIST No. 38 The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed James Madison
FEDERALIST No. 39 The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles James Madison
FEDERALIST No. 40 The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained James Madison
FEDERALIST No. 41 General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution James Madison
FEDERALIST No. 42 The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered James Madison
FEDERALIST No. 43 The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered (con't) James Madison
FEDERALIST No. 44 Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States James Madison
FEDERALIST No. 45 The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered James Madison
FEDERALIST No. 46 The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared James Madison
FEDERALIST No. 47 The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts James Madison
FEDERALIST No. 48 These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other James Madison
FEDERALIST No. 49 Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention Alexander Hamilton or James Madison
FEDERALIST No. 50 Periodical Appeals to the People Considered Alexander Hamilton or James Madison
FEDERALIST No. 51 The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments Alexander Hamilton or James Madison

The Legislative Branch (52-66)

FEDERALIST No. 52 The House of Representatives Alexander Hamilton or James Madison
FEDERALIST No. 53 The House of Representatives (con't) Alexander Hamilton or James Madison
FEDERALIST No. 54 The Apportionment of Members Among the States Alexander Hamilton or James Madison
FEDERALIST No. 55 The Total Number of the House of Representatives Alexander Hamilton or James Madison
FEDERALIST No. 56 The Total Number of the House of Representatives (con't) Alexander Hamilton or James Madison
FEDERALIST No. 57 The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation Alexander Hamilton or James Madison
FEDERALIST No. 58 Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered James Madison
FEDERALIST No. 59 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 60 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't) Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 61 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't) Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 62 The Senate Alexander Hamilton or James Madison
FEDERALIST No. 63 The Senate (con't) Alexander Hamilton or James Madison
FEDERALIST No. 64 The Powers of the Senate John Jay
FEDERALIST No. 65 The Powers of the Senate (con't) Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 66 Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered Alexander Hamilton

The Executive Branch (67-77)

FEDERALIST No. 67 The Executive Department Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 68 The Mode of Electing the President Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 69 The Real Character of the Executive Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 70 The Executive Department Further Considered Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 70 The Executive Department Further Considered Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 71 The Duration in Office of the Executive Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 72 The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 73 The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 74 The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 75 The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 76 The Appointing Power of the Executive Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 77 The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered Alexander Hamilton

The Judicial Branch (78-83)

FEDERALIST No. 78 The Judiciary Department Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 79 The Judiciary (con't) Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 80 The Powers of the Judiciary Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 81 The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 82 The Judiciary Continued Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 83 The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury Alexander Hamilton

Conclusions and Miscellaneous Ideas

FEDERALIST No. 84 Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered Alexander Hamilton
FEDERALIST No. 85 Concluding Remarks Alexander Hamilton
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6 闂備礁鎲¢敋婵☆偅顨夐妵鎰板醇閺囩偟鐣遍悷婊冪箰閳绘捇骞嬮悙娈挎锤闂侀潧鐗嗗Λ娆戠礊閳ь剚绻涢幋鐐村碍濡ょ姵鎮傞幆鍥ㄧ節濮橆剙鐝橀梺璺ㄥ櫐閹凤拷 濠电姰鍨归悥銏ゅ礃閳哄喚娲┑鐘殿暯閳ь剙鍟块埀顒€缍婇獮鎴︽晲閸℃劒绮撻梺璺ㄥ櫐閹凤拷
7 闂備胶顢婂▔娑㈡晝閿濆洤濮柛鏇ㄥ幗鐎氬鏌ょ憴鍕凡闁搞劋绀侀埥澶愬箻閹颁礁鍓伴悷婊呭閹告娊寮鍥︽勃闁芥ê顦遍崢鐑樼箾閹寸偞灏紒澶嬫尦椤㈡瑩骞囬鍓э紳闂佺懓鐏濈€氼喚澹曢敓锟� 闂佽崵濮撮鍛村疮閳哄啯顐芥繝闈涱儏缁€鍐╃箾閹寸偟鎳勯柡澶涙嫹
8 闂備浇澹堟慨銈囨暜閹烘缁╁┑鍌氭啞閺咁剚鎱ㄥΟ铏癸紞婵炲牐浜埀顒侇問閸犳牜鈧凹鍙冮、妤冣偓娑櫳戞刊鎾煟濡櫣锛嶆俊鏌ユ敱閹便劌鈹戞繝搴℃暯婵°倗濮甸幃鍌氼嚕閻㈠壊鏁嗛柛鎰靛枤閸欐劙姊洪崫鍕闁瑰憡濞婂畷鎶藉传閵夛箑鏆梺璺ㄥ櫐閹凤拷 濠电姰鍨归悥銏ゅ礃閳哄喚娲┑鐘殿暯閳ь剙鍟块埀顒€缍婇獮鎴︽晲閸℃劒绮撻梺璺ㄥ櫐閹凤拷
9 濠电偛鐡ㄧ划宀勫嫉椤掑嫬鍨傛い鎺戝閸ゅ嫭绻濇繝鍌氭殭闁绘帗妞介弻娑滅疀閿濆懍绨婚悗瑙勬礀鐎氫即鎮伴鑺ョ秶闁告挆鍜佹Х闂備胶鍘ч〃搴㈢閻愬搫鏋侀梺顒€绉磋繚婵炶揪绲藉﹢鍗炐掔仦瑙f闁规崘顕栭崬铏圭磼濡も偓閻倸顕i弻銉︽櫢闁跨噦鎷� 濠电姰鍨归悥銏ゅ礃閳哄喚娲┑鐘殿暯閳ь剙鍟块埀顒€缍婇獮鎴︽晲閸℃劒绮撻梺璺ㄥ櫐閹凤拷
10 1960婵°倗濮烽崑鐔妓夐幇顓犵彾婵☆垯缍嶅☉銏╂晩闁兼剚鍨遍崕閿嬬節閻㈤潧浠掔紒鈧笟鈧幆鍐偨缁嬫寧宓嶉梺闈浨归崕閬嶆煀鏉堛劎绡€闁逞屽墴閹瑩顢楁笟鍥ㄐ濋梻浣圭湽閸斿瞼鈧凹鍨堕崺鈧い鎴e劵閸忓矂鏌涘▎娆愬 濠电姰鍨归悥銏ゅ礃閳哄喚娲┑鐘殿暯閳ь剙鍟块埀顒€缍婇獮鎴︽晲閸℃劒绮撻梺璺ㄥ櫐閹凤拷
一周回复热帖
1 婵犳鍣徊鍓х矙閹邦喒鍋撻棃娑氱伇闁轰緡鍣i、姗€妾遍柡澶夌矙閺屾盯骞囬棃娑橆潻闂侀潧娲らˇ鐢稿箚閸愵喖绀嬫い鎰С閸犲﹪姊婚崒姘殭闁告ɑ鐗滅划鈺呭箻椤斿吋顥濋梺鎼炲労閸撴碍绂嶉妶鍛闁瑰灝鍟獮妯荤箾閸喎鐏︾紒杞扮矙閺佹捇鏁撻敓锟� 闂佽崵濮撮鍛村疮閳哄啯顐芥繝闈涱儏缁€鍐╃箾閹寸偟鎳勯柡澶涙嫹
2 闂備焦瀵х粙鎴︽偋閸涱垱顐介柣銏⑶归惌妤呮煕鐏炲墽濡囬柛瀣崌瀹曟ḿ鎹勯妸褜妲撮梻渚€娼уΛ妤呮晝閵壯呯焾妞ゆ帒瀚崙鐘绘煙闁箑鏋涙い銉︻殜閺岋繝宕奸悤浣圭暦濠电偛鎳忛敃銏′繆閹绢喗鏅搁柨鐕傛嫹 濠电姰鍨归悥銏ゅ礃閳哄喚娲┑鐘殿暯閳ь剙鍟块埀顒€缍婇獮鎴︽晲閸℃劒绮撻梺璺ㄥ櫐閹凤拷
3 1960婵°倗濮烽崑鐔妓夐幇顓犵彾婵☆垯缍嶅☉銏╂晩闁兼剚鍨遍崕閿嬬節閻㈤潧浠掔紒鈧笟鈧幆鍐偨缁嬫寧宓嶉梺闈浨归崕閬嶆煀鏉堛劎绡€闁逞屽墴閹瑩顢楁笟鍥ㄐ濋梻浣圭湽閸斿瞼鈧凹鍨堕崺鈧い鎴e劵閸忓矂鏌涘▎娆愬 濠电姰鍨归悥銏ゅ礃閳哄喚娲┑鐘殿暯閳ь剙鍟块埀顒€缍婇獮鎴︽晲閸℃劒绮撻梺璺ㄥ櫐閹凤拷
4 50%闂備焦瀵х粙鎰版嚄閸撲焦顐介柕濠忓閳绘梹銇勯幘璺轰粶闁绘挸鍊块獮鏍偓娑櫳戠粈澶愭煟閵婏妇绠炴鐐╁亾闂佺ǹ鐭夋俊鍥触閿燂拷 濠电姰鍨归悥銏ゅ礃閳哄喚娲┑鐘殿暯閳ь剙鍟块埀顒€缍婇獮鎴︽晲閸℃劒绮撻梺璺ㄥ櫐閹凤拷
5 濠电姰鍨归悥銏ゅ炊閵夈儰鍑介梻浣藉婵倗鏁繝鍥ㄥ殘闁瑰瓨绶风憴鍕缂佹稑顑嗛弬鈧繝鐢靛仦閹矂宕板☉銏犵;妞ゅ繐鐗婇崕澶愭煥閻曞倹瀚� 濠电姰鍨归悥銏ゅ礃閳哄喚娲┑鐘殿暯閳ь剙鍟块埀顒€缍婇獮鎴︽晲閸℃劒绮撻梺璺ㄥ櫐閹凤拷
6 闂備礁鎲$敮妤冩暜濡も偓椤啴宕掑☉姘兼祫闂佹寧绻傚ú锕傛偩鏉堚晝纾介柛銉戝懎鍤紓浣哄О閸婃繈骞嗙仦鎯х窞闁归棿鑳跺畷婊堟⒑閸涘⿴娈旂紒缁橆殜椤㈡瑩宕ㄩ弶鎴犵杸闂婎偄娲ゅù鐑芥偪閸涘瓨鈷戦柟缁樺笧瀛濋梺闈涙祫閹凤拷 濠电姰鍨归悥銏ゅ礃閳哄喚娲┑鐘殿暯閳ь剙鍟块埀顒€缍婇獮鎴︽晲閸℃劒绮撻梺璺ㄥ櫐閹凤拷
7 闂佸搫顦弲娑樏洪妶澶屽祦闁瑰墽绮崕宥夋煕閵夋垵鎷嬮崑鈺呮⒑閸濆嫬顏甸柟鍑ゆ嫹"闂備礁鎲¢崝鎴﹀磹閺囥垹桅闁搞儯鍔岀欢鐐烘煥閻曞倹瀚�"闂備焦瀵ч崘濠氬箯閿燂拷 濠电姰鍨归悥銏ゅ礃閳哄喚娲┑鐘殿暯閳ь剙鍟块埀顒€缍婇獮鎴︽晲閸℃劒绮撻梺璺ㄥ櫐閹凤拷
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9 闂備礁鎲¢敋婵☆偅顨夐妵鎰板醇閺囩偟鐣遍悷婊冪箰閳绘捇骞嬮悙娈挎锤闂侀潧鐗嗗Λ娆戠礊閳ь剚绻涢幋鐐村碍濡ょ姵鎮傞幆鍥ㄧ節濮橆剙鐝橀梺璺ㄥ櫐閹凤拷 濠电姰鍨归悥銏ゅ礃閳哄喚娲┑鐘殿暯閳ь剙鍟块埀顒€缍婇獮鎴︽晲閸℃劒绮撻梺璺ㄥ櫐閹凤拷
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